The history of the South African forces in FranceBuchan, John
History
The history of the South African forces in France
Buchan, John
South Africa. Army; World War, 1914-1918 -- Campaigns -- France; World War, 1914-1918 -- Regimental histories -- South Africa
On 4th March the South Africans were relieved by the 26th Brigade, and
marched from Arras to the neighbourhood of Ostreville, where they began
their intensive training for the coming offensive. Their casualties
during the previous three months in the line had been 2 officers and
49 other ranks killed, and 5 officers and 166 other ranks wounded. The
health of the men, considering the severity of the weather, had been
extraordinarily good, and only twenty-eight cases of trench feet were
reported. As was dryly observed, the doubt as to whether they could
stand a northern winter was settled by keeping them continuously in
the trenches. On 5th March Sir Douglas Haig inspected the 1st and 4th
Regiments, and complimented them highly on their smartness; and on 11th
March the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Regiments were inspected by the Colonial
Secretary, Mr. Walter Long.
While the South Africans were beginning their intensive training, the
Germans were completing their retirement from the Bapaume Ridge to
the Siegfried Line. At the hamlet of Tilloy-lès-Mofflaines, on the
Arras-Cambrai road, this line branched off from the old front. Beaurains
was now ours, and Arras was therefore free from its former encirclement
in the south. The German position from the northern pivot of the new
Siegfried Line to Lens was very strong, consisting of three main systems,
each constructed on the familiar pattern of four parallel lines of
trenches studded with redoubts, and linked up by numerous switches. A
special and very powerful switch line ran for 5½ miles from the village
of Feuchy northward across the Scarpe to beyond Thélus, and constituted
what was virtually a fourth line of defence. The whole defensive belt was
from two to five miles deep, but the German High Command were not content
with it. They had designed an independent line running from Drocourt,
south-east of Lens, to the Siegfried Line at Quéant as an alternative
in case of an assault on the Arras salient. Towards the close of March
this position, which was to become famous as the Drocourt-Quéant Switch,
was not complete. It was intended as a protection to Douai and Cambrai,
the loss of which would have made the whole Siegfried system untenable.
But it was designed only as an extra precaution, for there was every
confidence in the mighty ramified defences between Lens and Tilloy and
in the resisting power of the northern Siegfried section. The country
through which the German positions ran was peculiarly suited to their
purpose. It represented the breakdown of the Picardy wolds into the flats
of the Scheldt, the last foothills of the uplands of northern France.
Long, low spurs reach out to the eastward separating the valleys of the
Scarpe, the Cojeul, and the Sensée, and their sides are scored with
smaller valleys—an ideal terrain for a defensive battle.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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