The History of the Thirty Years' WarSchiller, Friedrich
History
The History of the Thirty Years' War
Schiller, Friedrich
Europe -- History -- 1517-1648; Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648
The disgrace of this day is to be ascribed principally to three
mistakes; his planting the cannon on the hills behind him, his
afterwards abandoning these heights, and his allowing the enemy, without
opposition, to form in order of battle. But how easily might those
mistakes have been rectified, had it not been for the cool presence of
mind and superior genius of his adversary!
Tilly fled from Halle to Halberstadt, where he scarcely allowed time for
the cure of his wounds, before he hurried towards the Weser to recruit
his force by the imperial garrisons in Lower Saxony.
The Elector of Saxony had not failed, after the danger was over, to
appear in Gustavus's camp. The king thanked him for having advised a
battle; and the Elector, charmed at his friendly reception, promised
him, in the first transports of joy, the Roman crown. Gustavus set out
next day for Merseburg, leaving the Elector to recover Leipzig. Five
thousand Imperialists, who had collected together after the defeat, and
whom he met on his march, were either cut in pieces or taken prisoners,
of whom again the greater part entered into his service. Merseburg
quickly surrendered; Halle was soon after taken, whither the Elector
of Saxony, after making himself master of Leipzig, repaired to meet the
king, and to concert their future plan of operations.
The victory was gained, but only a prudent use of it could render it
decisive. The imperial armies were totally routed, Saxony free from
the enemy, and Tilly had retired into Brunswick. To have followed him
thither would have been to renew the war in Lower Saxony, which had
scarcely recovered from the ravages of the last. It was therefore
determined to carry the war into the enemy's country, which, open and
defenceless as far as Vienna, invited attack. On their right, they might
fall upon the territories of the Roman Catholic princes, or penetrate,
on the left, into the hereditary dominions of Austria, and make the
Emperor tremble in his palace. Both plans were resolved on; and the
question that now remained was to assign its respective parts. Gustavus
Adolphus, at the head of a victorious army, had little resistance to
apprehend in his progress from Leipzig to Prague, Vienna, and Presburg.
As to Bohemia, Moravia, Austria, and Hungary, they had been stripped of
their defenders, while the oppressed Protestants in these countries
were ripe for a revolt. Ferdinand was no longer secure in his capital:
Vienna, on the first terror of surprise, would at once open its gates.
The loss of his territories would deprive the enemy of the resources
by which alone the war could be maintained; and Ferdinand would, in all
probability, gladly accede, on the hardest conditions, to a peace which
would remove a formidable enemy from the heart of his dominions. This
bold plan of operations was flattering to a conqueror, and success
perhaps might have justified it. But Gustavus Adolphus, as prudent as he
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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