The casualties, especially in officers, were very heavy. By 6 A.M. on the 14th the only two officers remaining in the 10th R.B. were Capt. S. J. Pegler and Lieut. Bidwell; they were awarded the D.S.O. and the M.C. respectively for their gallant actions on this day. The battalion lost altogether 11 officers killed, 4 officers wounded, and over 200 men. Preparations were made for a company of the 10th K.R.R.C. and a company of the 11th K.R.R.C. to capture Au Bon Gite at 2 A.M. on the 15th, with the assistance of trench mortars, machine-gun fire from the 217th Machine Gun Company, and six R.E. detachments from the 83rd Field Company to blow in the doors. The artillery put down a barrage according to orders, but owing to the darkness of the night, the difficulties of communication, and the continuous shell and machine-gun fire, the troops could not reach their jumping-off ground in time. The attack was therefore cancelled by the senior officer on the spot. Although the strong point at Au Bon Gite had not been reduced, the Steenbeek had been crossed and sufficient ground gained to enable the assaulting waves for the main attack to be formed up on the far side. The way was now clear for the larger operation, which included the capture of Langemarck. This was fixed for the 16th of August, and was part of an attack carried out by the Allied armies on the east and north of Ypres. The attack on the 20th Division front was made by the 60th Brigade on the right and the 61st on the left. These two brigades on the night of the 14th/15th relieved the 59th, which went back into reserve on the canal bank, leaving, however, the 10th and the 11th R.B. as covering troops on the east side of the Steenbeek. After the losses incurred in the operations of the last week this brigade was very weak, and two battalions of the 38th Division were attached to the 20th as Divisional reserve. The first objective followed the road bounding the west edge of Langemarck; the second was clear of the village on the east side of it; the third and final objective ran east of Schreiboom, and was part of the German Gheluvelt-Langemarck line. The direction of the attack was north-east, with the left resting on the Ypres-Staden railway. The extent of the front increased from 1000 yards on the Steenbeek to 1400 on the final objective. The boundary between brigades as far as the first objective was the Langemarck road; it then skirted the south of Langemarck and of Schreiboom. It will be seen that this gave a wider front to the 61st Brigade than to the 60th until the final objective was reached. The reasons for this were as follows: (1) The 61st Brigade was thus made responsible for the whole village of Langemarck. (2) The 60th Brigade on a narrower front would be able to keep one battalion in reserve; this brigade was more liable to be attacked from the direction of Poelcapelle, where the enemy was known to keep his reserves.