In the French and Indian wars there is abundant evidence that both armies depended largely upon the natives, and that when they failed to take the advice of their savage allies they generally met with disaster. This advice was valuable, not only because the Indians knew the country, but because their strategy was of a high order. The reader may have seen at Fort George the statue of Sir William Johnson and King Hendrix, the Mohawk chief. The latter holds in his hand a bundle of sticks. Tradition says that the chief was arguing against the division of their forces to meet the approaching French army, saying: "If we are to fight, we are too few: if we are to die, we are too many!" As an Indian, and having often heard my people discuss strategic details, I am almost sure that the chief anticipated the tactics of the enemy; and the pathetic sequel is that he was selected to lead a portion of the English forces to Fort Edward that morning, and when only a mile or so out was ambushed by the enemy. He stood his ground, urging his men to face the foe; and when he was shot dead, they were so enraged that with extraordinary valor they routed the French, and thus Hendrix in dying was really the means of saving Forts George and Edward for the colonists. History says that Braddock was defeated and lost his life at Fort Duquesne because he had neglected and disregarded his Indian scouts, who accordingly left him, and he had no warning of the approach of the foe. Again, the Seminole war in Florida was a failure so long as no Indians were found who were willing to guide the army, and the Government was compelled to make terms, while the swift and overwhelming defeat of the Creeks, a much stronger nation, was due more to the Cherokee and Chickasaw scouts than to the skill of General Jackson. Of course, once the army is guided to an Indian village, and the warriors are surprised in the midst of their women and children, the civilized folk, with superior weapons and generally superior numbers, has every advantage. The Indian system of scouting has long been recognized as one of the most useful adjuncts of war. His peculiar and efficient methods of communication in the field by means of blanket signals, smoke signals, the arrangement of rock-piles, and by heliograph (small mirrors or reflectors), the last, of course, in more modern days, have all been made use of at one time or another by the United States Army. It is interesting evidence of the world-wide respect for our strategy and methods, that when the Boer commission came to Washington a few years ago, Mr. Vessel called upon me to advise him how he might secure one thousand Sioux and Cheyenne scouts in their war against Great Britain. Of course I told him that it could not be done: that I would not involve my country in an international difficulty. I was similarly approached during the Russo-Japanese war.