Social ethics in inclusive sense is the correlative science. Dealing not with the form or mode or machinery of action, it attempts rather to make out its filling and make up the values that are necessary to constitute an experience which is worth while. The sociologist, like the psychologist, often presents himself as a camp follower of genuine science and philosophy, picking up scraps here and there and piecing them together in somewhat of an aimless fashion--fortunate indeed, if not vague and over-ambitious. Yet social ethics represents the attempt to translate philosophy from a general and therefore abstract method into a working and specific method; it is the change from inquiring into the nature of value in general to inquiring as to the _particular_ values that ought to be realized in the life of every one, and as to the conditions which render possible this realization. There are those who will see in this conception of the outcome of a four-hundred-year discussion concerning the nature and possibility of knowledge a derogation from the high estate of philosophy. There are others who will see in it a sign that philosophy, after wandering aimlessly hither and yon in a wilderness without purpose or outcome, has finally come to its senses--has given up metaphysical absurdities and unverifiable speculations, and become a purely positive science of phenomena. But there are yet others who will see in this movement the fulfilment of its vocation, the clear consciousness of a function that it has always striven to perform; and who will welcome it as a justification of the long centuries when it appeared to sit apart, far from the common concerns of man, busied with discourse of essence and cause, absorbed in argument concerning subject and object, reason and sensation. To such this outcome will appear the inevitable sequel of the saying of Socrates that “an unexamined life is not one fit to be led by man”; and a better response to his injunction “Know thyself.” THE END INDEX Absolutism, 18, 25, 98, 102, 109-110, 121-123, 130-132; _Essay IV._, 142-153, 176, 180-181 Acquaintance, and knowledge, 79-82 Action, and problem of knowledge, _Essay XI._, 271-304 _A priori_, 206-213, 292-294 Appearance, and reality, 26-28, 118-121 Aristotle, referred to, 5, 32, 35, 37, 48, 50, 78, 221, 278 Assurance, 85-88 Awareness, 93 Behavior, and intelligence, 44 Belief, _Essay VI._, 169-197 Bosanquet, B., 281 Bradley, F. H., _Essay IV._, 112-153 Change, its supposed unreality, 1; in modern science, 8-9; and law, 72; and thought, 133; of truth, 153; of experience, 222-224, 259-260; Christianity, metaphysic of, 178 Cognitive, 84-85, 230-233 Conflict, and thinking, 116-117, 126-127, 132, 148-149 Consistency, as criterion, 128-136 Consciousness, as end of nature, 34-35; is partial, 43; and knowledge, 79-80, 102, 171; _Essay X._, 242-270; non-existence of, 247-248