It is interesting to note that the transcendentalist almost invariably first falls into the psychological fallacy; and then having himself taken the psychologist’s attitude (the attitude which is interested in meanings as themselves self-inclosed “ideas”) accuses the empiricist whom he criticises of having confused mere psychological existence with logical validity. That is, he begins by supposing that the smell of our illustration (and all the cognitional objects for which this is used as a symbol) is a purely mental or psychical state, so that the question of logical reference or intention is the problem of how the merely mental can “know” the extra-mental. But from a strictly empirical point of view, the smell which knows is no more merely mental than is the rose known. We may, if we please, say that the smell when involving conscious meaning or intention is “mental,” but this term “mental” does not denote some separate type of existence--existence as a state of consciousness. It denotes only the fact that the smell, a real and non-psychical object, now exercises an intellectual _function_. This new property involves, as James has pointed out, an _additive_ relation--a new property possessed by a non-mental object, when that object, occurring in a new context, assumes a further office and use.[17] To be “in the mind” means to be in a situation in which the function of intending is directly concerned.[18] Will not some one who believes that the knowing experience is _ab origine_ a strictly “mental” thing, explain how, as matter of fact, it does get a specific, extra-mental reference, capable of being tested, confirmed, or refuted? Or, if he believes that viewing it as merely mental expresses only the form it takes for psychological analysis, will he not explain why he so persistently attributes the inherently “mental” characterization of it to the empiricist whom he criticises? An object _becomes_ meaning when used empirically in a certain way; and, under certain circumstances, the exact character and worth of this meaning _becomes_ an object of solicitude. But the transcendental epistemologist with his purely psychical “meanings” and his purely extra-empirical “truths” assumes a _Deus ex Machina_ whose mechanism is preserved a secret. And as if to add to the arbitrary character of his assumption, he has to admit that the transcendental _a priori_ faculty by which mental states get objective reference does not in the least help us to discriminate, _in the concrete_, between an objective reference that is false and one that is valid.