The influence of Greek ideas and usages upon the Christian churchHatch, Edwin
Philosophy
The influence of Greek ideas and usages upon the Christian church
Hatch, Edwin
Church history -- Primitive and early church, ca. 30-600; Philosophy -- History; Philosophy, Ancient; Theology, Doctrinal
There was less divergence in the definitions themselves than there was
in the propositions that were deduced from them. That is to say, there
was a verbal agreement as to definitions which was not a real agreement
of ideas: the same words were found on examination to cover different
areas of thought. But whether the difference lay in the definitions
themselves or in the deductions made from them, there was nothing to
determine which of two contrary or contradictory propositions was true.
There was no universally recognized standard of appeal, or _criterion_,
as it was termed. Indeed, the question of the nature of the criterion
was one of the chief questions at issue. Consequently, assertions about
abstract ideas and wide generalizations could only be regarded as the
affirmations of a personal conviction. The making of such an affirmation
was expressed by the same phrase which was used for a resolution of
the will—“It seems to me,” or “It seems (good) to me” (δοκεῖ μοι): the
affirmation itself, by the corresponding substantive, _dogma_ (δόγμα).
But just as the resolutions of the will of a monarch were obeyed by his
subjects, that is, were adopted as resolutions of the will of other
persons, so the affirmations of a thinker might be assented to by those
who listened to him, that is, might become affirmations of other persons.
In the one case as in the other, the same word _dogma_ was employed.[205]
It thus came to express (1) a decree, (2) a doctrine. The latter use
tended to predominate. The word came ordinarily to express an affirmation
made by a philosopher which was accepted as true by those who, from the
fact of so accepting it, became his followers and formed his school.
The acquiescence of a large number of men in the same affirmation gave
to such an affirmation a high degree of probability; but it did not
cause it to lose its original character of a personal conviction, nor
did it afford any guarantee that the coincidence of expression was also
a coincidence of ideas either between the original thinker and his
disciples, or between the disciples themselves.[206]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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