The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
History
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783
Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
Naval history, Modern; Sea-power
enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and
which, by controlling the great common, closes the highways by which
commerce moves to and from the enemy's shores. This overbearing power
can only be exercised by great navies, and by them (on the broad sea)
less efficiently now than in the days when the neutral flag had not
its present immunity. It is not unlikely that, in the event of a war
between maritime nations, an attempt may be made by the one having a
great sea power and wishing to break down its enemy's commerce, to
interpret the phrase "effective blockade" in the manner that best
suits its interests at the time; to assert that the speed and disposal
of its ships make the blockade effective at much greater distances and
with fewer ships than formerly. The determination of such a question
will depend, not upon the weaker belligerent, but upon neutral powers;
it will raise the issue between belligerent and neutral rights; and if
the belligerent have a vastly overpowering navy he may carry his
point, just as England, when possessing the mastery of the seas, long
refused to admit the doctrine of the neutral flag covering the goods.
FOOTNOTES:
[16] Davies: History of Holland.
[17] République d'Angleterre.
[18] Lefèvre-Pontalis: Jean de Witt.
[19] Martin: History of France.
[20] Gougeard: Marine de Guerre.
[21] Since the above was written, the experience of the English autumn
manoeuvres of 1888 has verified this statement; not indeed that any
such experiment was needed to establish a self-evident fact.
[22] Chabaud-Arnault: Revue Mar. et Col. 1885.
[23] The recent development of rapid-firing and machine guns, with the
great increase of their calibre and consequent range and penetration,
reproduces this same step in the cycle of progress.
[24] Gougeard: Marine de Guerre.
[25] Vol. lxxxii. p. 137.
[26] Mémoires du Cte. de Guiche. À Londres, chez P. Changuion. 1743
pp. 234-264.
[27] See Map of English Channel and North Sea, page 107.
[28] Plate I., June 11, 1666, Fig. 1. V, van; C, centre; R, rear: in
this part of the action the Dutch order was inverted, so that the
actual van was the proper rear. The great number of ships engaged in
the fleet actions of these Anglo-Dutch wars make it impossible to
represent each ship and at the same time preserve clearness in the
plans. Each figure of a ship therefore represents a group more or less
numerous.
[29] Campbell: Lives of the Admirals.
[30] Plate I., June 12, Fig. 1, V, C, R.
[31] Plate II., June 14, Fig. 1, E, D.
[32] Fig. 1, V, C, R. This result was probably due simply to the
greater weatherliness of the English ships. It would perhaps be more
accurate to say that the Dutch had sagged to leeward so that they
drifted through the English line.
[33] Lefèvre-Pontalis. Jean de Witt.
[34] Mémoires, pp. 249, 251, 266, 267.
[35] Chabaud-Arnault: Revue Mar. et Col. 1885.
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