The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
History
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783
Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
Naval history, Modern; Sea-power
The destruction or dispersal of the Toulon fleet stopped the invasion
of England, though the five ships that got into Cadiz remained a
matter of anxiety to Sir Edward Hawke, who cruised before Brest.
Choiseul, balked of his main object, still clung to the invasion of
Scotland. The French fleet at Brest, under Marshal de Conflans, a sea
officer despite his title, numbered twenty sail-of-the-line, besides
frigates. The troops to be embarked are variously stated at fifteen to
twenty thousand. The original purpose was to escort the transports
with only five ships-of-the-line, besides smaller vessels. Conflans
insisted that the whole fleet ought to go. The minister of the navy
thought that the admiral was not a sufficiently skilful tactician to
be able to check the advance of an enemy, and so insure the safe
arrival of the convoy at its destination near the Clyde without
risking a decisive encounter. Believing therefore that there would be
a general action, he considered that it would be better to fight it
before the troops sailed; for if disastrous, the convoy would not be
sacrificed, and if decisively victorious, the road would then be
clear. The transports were assembled, not at Brest, but in the ports
to the southward as far as the mouth of the Loire. The French fleet
therefore put to sea with the expectation and purpose of fighting the
enemy; but it is not easy to reconcile its subsequent course with that
purpose, nor with the elaborate fighting instructions[100] issued by
the admiral before sailing.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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