Following the Roman law, the Inquisition at first recognized three forms of action in criminal cases--_accusatio, denuntiatio_, and _inquisitio_. In the _accusatio_, the accuser formally inscribed himself as able to prove his accusation; if he failed to do so, he had to undergo the penalty which the prisoner would have incurred (_poena talionis_).[1] "From the very beginning, he was placed in the same position as the one he accused, even to the extent of sharing his imprisonment."[2] The _denuntiatio_ did not in any way bind the accuser; he merely handed in his testimony, and then ceased prosecuting the case; the judge at once proceeded to take action against the accused. In the _inquisitio_, there was no one either to accuse or denounce the criminal; the judge cited the suspected criminal before him and proceeded to try him. This was the most common method of procedure; from it the Inquisition received its name.[3] [1] Tanon, op. cit., p. 260, n. 4. [2] Tancrède, _Ordo judiciorum_, lib. ii. [3] On these three forms of action, cf. Eymeric, _Directorium_, 3a pars, p. 413 et seq. The Inquisitorial procedure was therefore inspired by the Roman law. But in practice the _accusatio_, which gave the prisoner a chance to meet the charges against him, was soon abandoned. In fact the Inquisitors were always most anxious to set it aside. Urban IV enacted a decree, July 28, 1262, whereby they were allowed to proceed _simpliciter et de plano, absque advocatorum strepitu et figura_.[1] Bernard Gui insisted on this in his _Practica_.[2] Eymeric advised his associates, when an accuser appeared before them who was perfectly willing to accept the _poena talionis_ in case of failure, to urge the imprudent man to withdraw his demand. For he argued that the _accusatio_ might prove harmful to himself, and besides give too much room for trickery.[3] In other words, the Inquisitors wished to be perfectly untrammeled in their action. [1] Bull _Præ cunctis_ of July 28, 1262. [2] _Practica_, 4a pars. ed. Douais, p. 192. [3] _Directorium_, p. 414. col. 1. The secrecy of the Inquisition's procedure was one of the chief causes of complaint. But the Inquisition, dreadful as it was, did not lack defenders. Some of their arguments were most extravagant and far-fetched. "Paramo, in the quaint pedantry with which he ingeniously proves that God was the first Inquisitor, and the condemnation of Adam and Eve the first model of the Inquisitorial process, triumphantly points out that he judges them in secret, thus setting the example which the Inquisition is bound to follow, and avoiding the subtleties which the criminals would have raised in their defence, especially at the suggestion of the crafty serpent. That he called no witnesses is explained by the confession of the accused, and ample legal authority is cited to show that these confessions were sufficient to justify the conviction and punishment."[1] [1] Lea, op. cit., vol. i, p. 406. . . . . . . . .