The Inquisition : $b a political and military study of its establishmentNickerson, Hoffman
History
The Inquisition : $b a political and military study of its establishment
Nickerson, Hoffman
Albigenses; Christian heresies -- History -- Middle Ages, 600-1500; Inquisition; Prohibition
Finally, the mediæval was no fool. I have made this point in my
first chapter; nevertheless, I repeat it here. We have seen that the
importance of cavalry and of fortification, especially of castles
(i.e., small highly-fortified points) resulted not from folly, but
from the conditions of the time. Social and political conditions,
again, were unfavorable to regular discipline, but no more so than in
our own American Revolution. Less so, in fact. It is true that there
was no regular study of war as an art. Nevertheless, our modern staff
colleges could not easily improve on the decisions of many mediæval
commanders. Even the lack of maps on which modern staff work is built
up did not necessarily blind the eye of the commander operating in
familiar or partially friendly country.
The men of the Middle Ages sometimes show the power of sizing up the
strategic essentials of a large theatre of war which they had never
seen, and had never even seen mapped. For instance, take the case of
Philip Augustus’s advice to his son with regard to the campaign of
1216 in England, that is that the Prince should first of all seize
the castle of Dover which commanded the English terminus to the
shortest possible sea route between England and France.
In the present instance, the mobilization point and the line of march
were intelligently chosen. It was clearly out of the question to
cross the “Massif Central,” the mountains of Auvergne, since armies
are compelled to seek the lines of geographical least resistance, and
must avoid, whenever possible, thinly peopled districts which cannot
keep them in food and shelter. The choice which faced the leaders of
the Crusade was whether to outflank the mountainous country by the
west or by the east.
It is only a guess, but I think that the decision to march by the
easterly route was mainly for political reasons. To march by the west
would have brought the crusading army close to territory still held
by John of England. That monarch was still firmly planted on both
sides of the lower Garonne, and had even held on to parts of Poitou
well to the north of that river. The much widowed Raymond of Toulouse
had married John’s sister Joan, who had since died. John had broken
with the Pope over the candidacy of Stephen Langton, later of Magna
Charta fame, for the archbishopric of Canterbury; and when Innocent
had replied by interdicting all England, John had been able to compel
most of the English clergy from enforcing the sentence. Since the
Crusade was obviously directed against Raymond, John might move.
It would be well, therefore, for the Crusaders not to give him an
opportunity of falling upon their flanks or rear while marching south
on the westward route.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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