in that it deprives the student of the free use of this familiar term in its familiar sense and therefore constrains him to bring the indispensable concept of instinct in again surreptitiously under cover of some unfamiliar term or some terminological circumlocution. The current mechanistic analyses of animal behaviour are of great and undoubted value to any inquiry into human conduct, but their value does not lie in an attempt to make them supersede those psychological phenomena which it is their purpose to explain. That such supersession of psychological phenomena by the mechanistic formulations need nowise follow and need not be entertained appears, e. g., in such work as that of Mr. Loeb, referred to above, _Comparative Physiology of the Brain and Comparative Psychology_. [13] Endless in the sense that the effects of such concatenation do not run to a final term in any direction. [14] Many students of animal behaviour are still, as psychologists generally once were, inclined to contrast instinct with intelligence, and to confine the term typically to such automatically determinate action as takes effect without deliberation or intelligent oversight. This view would appear to be a remnant of an earlier theoretical position, according to which all the functions of intelligence were referred to a distinct immaterial entity, entelechy, associated in symbiosis with the physical organism. If all such preconceptions of a substantial dichotomy between physiological and psychological activity be abandoned it becomes a matter of course that intellectual functions themselves take effect only on the initiative of the instinctive dispositions and under their surveillance, and the antithesis between instinct and intelligence will consequently fall away. What expedients of terminology and discrimination may then be resorted to in the study of those animal instincts that involve a minimum of intellect is of course a question for the comparative psychologists. Cf., for instance, C. Lloyd Morgan, _Introduction to Comparative Psychology_ (2nd edition, 1906) ch. xii, especially pp. 206–209, and _Habit and Instinct_, ch. i and vi. [15] Cf. H. S. Jennings, _Behavior of the Lower Animals_, ch. xii, xx, xxi. [16] See McDougall, _Introduction to Social Psychology_, ch. iii and x. [17] Cf. M. F. Washburn, _The Animal Mind_, ch. x, xi, where the simpler facts of habituation are suggestively presented in conformity with current views of empirical psychology. [18] Cf., e. g., Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central Australia_; Seligmann, _The Veddas_. [19] Hutton Webster, _Primitive Secret Societies_, especially ch. iii and iv. [20] J. G. Frazer, _Early History of the Kingship_, ch. iv, p. 107. [21] E. g., some native tribes of Australia; cf. Spencer and Gillen, _The Native Tribes of Central Australia_, especially ch. i. [22] Skeat and Blagden, _Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula_.