[73] Actual manning detail for New Bedford defenses, 1914, one company regular Coast Artillery. [74] There is said to be only one firm in the United States that can produce the rifling tools, jigs, gauges and other exact and intricate machinery needed to make a rifle. Consequently, the loss of the Springfield Arsenal would be disastrous. [75] Official statistics. [76] Large numbers of guns and large numbers of ammunition are liable to capture and destruction.... To start into field operations with the expectation that the proper proportions will be maintained without large sources of manufacture, would be fallacious.”--Chief of Staff, U. S. A., 1914.--See Report on Militia Organization, 1914, for comments on the great loss and destruction of equipment and material. [77] Some observers of the European War declare that the reserve of one gun per man has proved itself necessary for the proper equipment of an active army. [78] “He,” i.e., Secretary Garrison, present Secretary of War, “asks for an increase in the number of officers to take the place, in time of peace, of such officers as are serving with the militia or on detached duty, and in time of war to assist in the organization of the citizens’ army. The necessity of these requests is self-evident. Yet the House of Representatives has completely ignored each and every one of them, and the pending appropriation bill contains no provision for them.”--Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary of War. [79] The scandal caused in 1898 by appointing incompetent civilians to the Quartermaster’s Department and the ensuing difficulties with commissariat, etc., have been the subject of much discussion. [80] Our War Department has asked for only about five guns to every thousand men, but has not yet been able to have this quota finished. European practice has been to increase the number of guns to the thousand rifles and sabers steadily. Before the war it was at least five. It has been enormously increased as a result of the experience gained during the recent fighting, in which it was established that infantry or cavalry without absolutely dominating gun protection were hopelessly weak. [81] These movements of advance bodies and patrols have been carefully worked out as a campaign problem. The lines of advance mentioned are those that present themselves to military observers as the ones most likely to be selected by an invading army moving toward Boston from a base on Narragansett Bay or Buzzards Bay. [82] So laid down as the most likely movement to be made by invading armies with heavy cavalry supports. [83] The elementary tactics for the procedure of every army that has to hold any extended territory. [84] Worked out from a consensus of opinions and plans by tactical experts both here and abroad.