Alexander having made these dispositions, ordered the infantry, which numbered nearly 6000 men, to follow him at the ordinary marching pace and in regular order, for when he saw that he was superior in cavalry, he took with himself only the horsemen, about 5000 in number, and led them forward at a rapid pace. Taurôn, the captain of the archers, he ordered to hasten forward with his men to give support to the cavalry. He had come to the conclusion that if Pôros engaged him with all his troops he would either, without difficulty, overpower him by charging with his cavalry, or would remain on the defensive till the infantry came up during the action, or that if the Indians, terrified by the marvellous audacity of his passage of the river, should take to flight, he would be able to pursue them closely, and the slaughter being thus all the greater there would not be left much more work for him to do. Aristoboulos says that the son of Pôros arrived with about 60 chariots before Alexander made the final passage from the large island, and that he could have hindered Alexander from landing (for he made the passage with difficulty even when no one opposed him), if the Indians had but leaped down from their chariots and fallen upon those who first stepped on shore. The prince, however, passed by with his chariots, and allowed Alexander to accomplish the passage in complete safety. Against these Indians Alexander, he says, despatched his horse archers, who easily put them to a rout which was by no means bloodless. Other writers say that while the troops were landing an encounter took place between the Indians who had come with the son of Pôros and Alexander at the head of his cavalry, and that as the son of Pôros had come with a superior force Alexander himself was wounded by the Indian prince, and that his favourite horse Boukephalas was killed, having been wounded, like his master, by the son of Pôros. But Ptolemy, the son of Lagos, with whom I agree, gives a different account, for he states, like the others, that Pôros sent off his son, but not in command of merely 60 chariots; and indeed it is not at all likely that Pôros, on learning from the scouts that either Alexander himself, or, at all events, a part of his army, had made the passage of the Hydaspês, would have sent his own son with no more than 60 chariots, which, considered as a reconnoitring party, would have been too numerous, and not rapid in retreat, but considered as meant to repel such of the enemy as had not yet crossed the river, and to attack those who had already landed, an altogether inadequate force. He says that the son of Pôros arrived at the head of 2000 men and 120 chariots, and that Alexander had made even the final passage from the island before the prince appeared upon the scene. _Chapter XV.—The arrangements made by Pôros for the conflict_