Great Britain -- History; Great Britain -- History, Naval
The Scots were encamped upon a mass of hilly ground lying three miles
above the junction of the Glen with the Till. The southern portion
of this mass is roughly circular at the base, from two to three
miles across in every direction and 700 feet high. On the north and
north-east it sinks somewhat sharply 400 feet to a valley, across
which a saddleback runs to a second mass, roughly quadrangular, nearly
four miles long and two in breadth. The western portion is 800 feet
high; Barley Hill, the southern spur, is 582; Flodden Edge, on the
north-east, overlooking the Till, is 509. The northern spur is called
Branxton Hill; it drops from 500 feet to 227 feet at Branxton Church,
just below.
If only three miles separated the armies, the Scots must have been
stationed on the southern mass, between Milfield and Kirknewton. The
artillery was at the foot of the slope. On the 7th there was a distant
cannonade, but no further fighting. The Scottish position was far too
strong to be attacked. On the 8th, therefore, Surrey moved to his right
across the Till to Barmoor. He was, so Hall says, only two miles from
the Scottish front. This must mean that the English outposts on the
ridge between Ford and Doddington were about two miles from the Till.
The English main army, however, was behind the ridge, out of view of
the Scots.
From the ridge--perhaps the part above Fordwood--Surrey and his son
reconnoitred James’s position. Holinshed says that it was the Admiral
who advised his father to make a turning movement across Twisel Bridge,
and so plant himself on the Scottish communications. Hall, who is very
detailed as to the Admiral’s doings, does not say so; in any case, the
decision rested with Surrey. The momentous resolution was taken, and at
daybreak the English army marched for Twisel.
[Illustration: PLAN OF THE FLODDEN MANŒUVRE.
Showing the English flank march behind the screen of hills.]
The Scots committed a fatal blunder in leaving Twisel Bridge unguarded.
It can, of course, be said for them that strategy so bold as that
of Surrey was almost unheard of in mediæval warfare. But there does
not appear to have been a picket at the bridge, nor does any attempt
seem to have been made to keep in touch with the English army by
means of the light Border moss-troopers. Either the Scottish leaders
were incapable of penetrating a skilful but hazardous design, or the
Borderers were surprisingly useless for scouting.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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