Finally, there is one fact that cannot be overlooked. Napoleon was no seaman. He was a great soldier--in his prime probably the greatest of modern times--but in naval matters he was an amateur. His admirals knew it only too well. His able Minister of Marine, Decrès, was always warning him that the concentration and manœuvring of sailing squadrons was a very different operation to that of the massing of troops on land. Others said the same. No doubt the timidity which has always characterized the French at sea had much to do with their caution and nervousness. But they were certainly right in the main. The French Navy was bad in quality; the Spanish Navy worse. Both together were inferior in numbers to that of Britain, and in quality there was no comparison. Numbers alone are no test of efficiency, and had Napoleon succeeded in concentrating 60 French and Spanish battleships in the Channel, the fleet would have been unable to meet with success a British force of 40, even discounting the great strength of the latter in three-decked vessels.[L] Mr. Julian Corbett, who has discussed the question exhaustively in ‘The Campaign of Trafalgar,’ is of opinion (1) that Napoleon was only saved from disaster up to Trafalgar by the crafty French admirals whom he despised so much; (2) that had the Franco-Spanish fleet really appeared in the Channel, the result would have been its utter destruction. [L] A three-decker was reckoned by tacticians as equal to two two-deckers. Colonel Desbrière, who has discussed the problem from the French side, and has collected almost all the evidence available, sums up Napoleon’s plans for gaining the command of the Channel in a scathing paragraph: ‘Two escapes from ports blockaded by a superior force; two blockades to be broken at Cadiz and Ferrol; a junction at Martinique, already indicated to the English by the despatch of Missiessy--such was the programme, if we confine ourselves to the letter of the instructions. It is useless for historians to admire it.’ And when Desbrière examines it further in order to find the Napoleonic touch, he practically comes to the conclusion that the Emperor was ready to stake all on a mere gambler’s throw with all the chances against him. If he won, it was well. If he lost, he sacrificed only his weak and inefficient navy. In fact, whether he won or lost, his reputation was safe; and how nervously tender he was of his untarnished renown it is easy to see in the multitudinous letters in which he tries to explain away his failures. So much for the naval situation. Considering next the army of invasion and its means of transport, the position was briefly as follows: