The Japan-Russia War: An Illustrated History of the War in the Far EastTyler, Sydney
History
The Japan-Russia War: An Illustrated History of the War in the Far East
Tyler, Sydney
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
The folly of this course is obvious to the veriest tyro in military
science. Kuropatkin's line was already too far extended for safety. On
his left flank, creeping gradually closer and working round to the
northeast to effect a wide turning movement, was General Kuroki, with
the 1st Army; General Nodzu, with the 3rd Army, was advancing from
Takushan in the direction of Kaichau; while in the extreme south
General Oku, having received large reinforcements, was able to hold
Port Arthur securely invested and to march northwards with forces
numbering 60,000 men, flushed with recent victory. The southward march
of Baron Stackelberg, therefore, was doomed to disaster from the first.
Not only was it highly improbable that he would ever succeed in getting
through to Port Arthur, but in case he had to retreat, he ran a grave
risk of being cut off by General Nodzu, and imperilling the position of
General Kuropatkin himself. This was exactly what happened in actual
fact.
[Sidenote: Old Tactics versus New]
The ill-fated expedition, after some preliminary skirmishing, met
General Oku's main body at Wafangkau or Telissu on the 15th of June.
Telissu is a village situated to the east of the railway line about 20
miles north of Port Adams. Nothing could better prove the superiority
of the Japanese over the Russians in the matter of tactics than the
dispositions which were made for this battle by Oku and Stackelberg
respectively. Kuropatkin's lieutenant fought in the old-fashioned
style, with his men closely packed together over a narrow front. The
Japanese, on the other hand, advanced in an open formation over a
widely extended area. At dawn General Oku ordered his troops to attack.
They advanced in two columns, the main body proceeding along the
railway line against the enemy's centre and right, while a second and
more mobile force worked round to the west to turn Stackelberg's right
flank. The Russians threw themselves fiercely upon the Japanese right
and centre, and for some hours the battle was hotly contested. But in
the meantime the turning movement to the west was proceeding with
entire success. Before he realized the imminence of the danger,
Stackelberg found that his right flank was driven in, and that his rear
was threatened. He withdrew troops from his left and centre to meet
this new danger; but it was too late, and he merely weakened his
position in one part of the field without strengthening it in another.
From three sides the Japanese now pressed their attack home, gradually
encircling the Russians with a ring of fire. The terrible effectiveness
of Oku's artillery was borne witness to afterwards by the Russians
themselves. Their positions were heaped with dead. General Stackelberg
in his dispatch describing the battle said that the 3rd and 4th
batteries of the 1st Artillery Brigade were literally cut to pieces by
the Japanese shells, and thirteen out of sixteen guns were rendered
completely useless.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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