"Radical failure" in war means far more than defeated plans. It carries with it an awful and immediate penalty levied in killed and wounded, and when the tale of losses came to be counted it was found to exceed even the most pessimistic anticipations. The Russian dead left on the field alone numbered no less than 13,333; and as the wounded, at the lowest estimate, cannot have been less than four to one, it is apparent that the total casualties suffered by General Kuropatkin's troops must have been between 60,000 and 70,000. An index to the severity of the fighting is afforded by an analysis of these returns, which shows that more than 5,000 Russian dead were found before both Oku's army and Kuroki's. Even the Russian General Staff, which has shown a decided tendency to minimize losses, did not venture to place those sustained at Sha-ho at less than 45,000 rank and file and 800 officers. The total Japanese losses, on the other hand, though heavy, were but a fraction of their foe's. Oyama placing them at 15,879. But the loss in life was not the only disastrous result of the battle for the army of the Czar. The Japanese captured 709 prisoners and 45 guns, with large quantities of arms and ammunition; and against these captures are to be set the twelve guns lost at Lonely-Tree Hill, rechristened by the Russians Putiloff Hill in honor of the officer who achieved the success, and who was immediately decorated by the Czar. In one sense the battle of the Sha-ho may be regarded as indecisive, in that it left the two contending armies again at a deadlock. At Liao-yang the strategy of both generals had failed, and in a less degree the same result was reached at Sha-ho; for Oyama's initial success could not be followed up to its legitimate and triumphant conclusion. But, on the other hand, Kuropatkin's effort to march to Liao-yang and make a diversion in favor of Port Arthur had signally failed; and the army which he had ostentatiously declared to be strong enough to take the offensive and had been hurled back by "the arrogant foe," who were at last to be "compelled to do the Russian will." It was in that circumstance that the real measure of the Japanese victory was to be found--that after eight months of war the armies of the Czar were still unequal to the task committed to them. Had Kuropatkin been even in a measure successful in this, his first great offensive movement, the moral effect could not have failed to be incalculable. As it was, it inflicted one more discouragement on troops that had experienced nothing but retreats and reverses from the opening of the campaign. The temper in which the Japanese accepted the new laurels which their army had won was eminently characteristic of a nation which has, in spite of all temptations to vainglory and exultation, comforted itself with perfect sobriety and self-restraint. The Mikado issued a rescript to his people, the terms of which are worth giving, if only for the