In addition to these ships there was a torpedo flotilla of 7 destroyers of 28 knots speed, and 8 torpedo-boats; the following vessels of the Volunteer Fleet: _Kiev_, _Vladimir_, _Voronej_ (each of 10,500 tons and with a speed of 12 knots), _Tambov_, and _Yawslar_ (each of 8,640 tons and with a speed of 12 knots); 13 transports armed with light guns; and a hospital ship, the _Orel_--not to be confused with the battleship of the same name. On paper, at least, this was a very formidable fleet; but its fighting efficiency appears much reduced on analysis. There were four modern battleships of a powerful type and of homogeneous design; but their value is much discounted by the fact that some of their consorts are distinctly less powerful; and in naval warfare the manoeuvring power of a fleet becomes that of its weakest item. This was proved very signally on the occasion of the engagement between Admiral Kamimura and the Vladivostock Squadron, when the Russian cruisers _Gromoboi_ and _Rossia_ suffered most severely from having to stand by the _Rurik_, the lame duck of the squadron. The _Ossliabia_, it is true was not much inferior to the battleships of the _Kniaz Suvaroff_ class. She was a sister ship to the _Peresviet_ and _Pobieda_, sunk in the harbor of Port Arthur, and was launched in 1898. But the _Sissoi Veliky_ and the _Navarin_ both dated from 1891, and were distinctly inferior in the all-important matter of speed, even their nominal speed never having been attained. The only armored cruisers with the Baltic Fleet--the _Admiral Nakhimoff_ and the _Dmiti Donskoi_--were barely entitled to their description, as they have a low speed, light armor, and comparatively small gun power. Certainly they were not fit, like the best armored cruisers of to-day, to lie in the line of battle. Some of the other cruisers were little more than armed merchantmen, and none of them were formidable warships. Another circumstance that detracted from the fighting value of this fleet was the character of the officers and crews. All Russia's best and most highly-trained sailors and marine engineers were sent out before the war to the Pacific Squadron; and she had no adequate reserve to draw on. The modern man-of-war's-man--whether he is in the engine-room or on the gun-deck--is a highly specialized product, and he cannot be turned out at a moment's notice. Stokers, artificers, engineers, as well as torpedo lieutenants, gunners, and even admirals, have to be carefully trained for years before they become efficient, and the inefficiency and inexperience of the scratch crews and raw officers put on board the Baltic Fleet was the main cause of the long delay in that fleet's departure and of the disaster that occurred immediately after the start had been made, and that nearly brought the voyage to a tragic and ignominious conclusion. When all these circumstances were taken into consideration, it became obvious that the Baltic Fleet was hopelessly