The Japan-Russia War: An Illustrated History of the War in the Far EastTyler, Sydney
History
The Japan-Russia War: An Illustrated History of the War in the Far East
Tyler, Sydney
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
brushes between patrols and pickets, wherein the Japanese were always
worsted, with the loss of a horse and rifle, or perhaps even of a
cooking-stove. But on the very day that the negotiations for the
surrender of Port Arthur were opened, a serious interruption to the
long inactivity on the Sha-ho occurred. The Russians attempted for the
first time a raid on the Japanese line of communications. It was an
attempt that an enterprising enemy would have made long before; for it
is to be remembered that every mile of the Japanese advance from the
sea rendered them increasingly dependent on the railway which they had
taken from the Russians. Their army on the Sha-ho was, roughly
speaking, more than one hundred miles from the nearest sea-base,
Niuchwang; and any interruption to that vulnerable line of
communications must inflict much inconvenience at least on Marshal
Oyama. The Russians, of course, were exposed to the same risk, and the
long line between Mukden and Harbin had, in fact, frequently been cut
by the Chunchuses--roving bands of fierce native horsemen, whose hatred
for the Muscovite invader had proved a valuable auxiliary to the
Japanese. Their activity, in many cases organized and directed by
Japanese officers, compelled Kuropatkin to guard jealously every mile
of the railway in his rear, and especially every bridge and culvert,
and this necessity of maintaining large forces on the lines of
communication seriously detracted from the effective strength of his
armies in the field. The Russians' idea of giving their enemy tit-tat
was at first merely tentative, however. A couple of officers,
practically unattended, managed to make their way southward almost as
far as Hai-cheng, which is itself some forty or fifty miles south of
Liao-yang. There they succeeded in blowing up a culvert and tearing up
some yards of railway line--damage which, though not serious in itself,
was enough to encourage similar attempts on a larger scale. Kuropatkin
knew that the bulk of the army which had been engaged in the siege of
Port Arthur was about to be entrained northward, and that with these
reinforcements for Oyama were to go the great siege trains which had
been employed in battering the ships and fortifications of the captured
fortress into submission. To cut off these reinforcements, perhaps to
capture train-loads of men and destroy some of the enemy's most
formidable artillery, would evidently be a great counter-stroke to the
effect produced by the fall of Port Arthur; and so a great Cossack raid
was authorized on the Japanese lines of communication. The scheme was
admirably conceived and organized, and it achieved at least the first
and most important condition of success--namely, a complete surprise.
At the outbreak of the war it was predicted in many quarters that what
must certainly turn the scale in favor of the Russian arms was Russia's
overwhelming superiority in cavalry. The experience of the Boer War had
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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