So narrow indeed is the water that as the Russian ships were pressed eastward toward Tsu Island the forts there got range of the battleships and sank the _Oslabya_. Togo's base was at Masampho, on the Korean coast. Thousands of Japanese knew this fact, but so deeply was the necessity for secrecy appreciated by all classes of the islanders that throughout the nine months of waiting the entire world never had the slightest intimation of the point from which Japan's defensive blow would be struck. The general impression was that Formosa, the southernmost of the Japanese archipelago, would be chosen. This opinion was fostered by show of activity there and by various orders calculated to mark this spot as of especial significance in the campaign. When Rozhdestvensky had traversed the Straits of Formosa without opposition and had reached the China coast north of there, Russians even rejoiced, declaring that their admiral had outwitted the Japanese by eluding their trap. Meantime Togo waited. His position enabled him to meet the enemy should the direct route to Vladivostok via the Straits of Korea and the Sea of Japan be chosen, or he was in position to sail northward to intercept the Russians should Rozhdestvensky decide to go further eastward into the Pacific, circle Japan, and finally approach Vladivostok by La Pelouse or another of the channels between the northern islands of the Japanese archipelago. When Rozhdestvensky headed north from the China coast toward the Straits of Korea he fell in with the plan of battle to meet which the whole genius of the Japanese admiral had been preparing. Only one detail failed to agree with what Togo had expected. He believed that the Russians would shun the narrow channel east of Tsu Island, nearer Japan, and would traverse the western channel between Tsu Island and Korea. In the latter event the blow would have been dealt by a dash from Mesampho. As it happened, the fleet had only to round the northern promontory of Tsu Island and fall upon the Russians in the most disadvantageous position that could have been found in all of the waters of the Orient. The strength of the fleets as they approached on that fateful Saturday morning may be shown in tabular form. The chief units are here given. In addition, there were twelve torpedo boat destroyers with the Russian fleet and a veritable swarm of destroyers and torpedo boats with the Japanese fleet. Nevertheless, the armada, with practically twice the number of Japanese battleships, would, on paper, have advantage over a large fleet, made up so largely of lighter vessels. [Sidenote: Russians in Double Line]