While the Japanese were thus concentrating on the left bank of the Yalu the Russians were gradually strengthening their positions on the right bank, the centre and key of which was formed by the village of Kiu-lien-cheng. During all these weeks the greatest secrecy was observed on both sides in regard to their numbers and dispositions--as far, at least, as the outside world was concerned. It seems probable from after events that the Russians themselves were largely ignorant of the strength of the force which General Kuroki had at his disposal; but, on the other hand, that able commander appears to have been thoroughly well informed in every detail as to the position occupied by his enemy. There was the greatest diversity of statement on the Russian side after the battle of the Yalu upon the question of the real intentions of General Kuropatkin in holding as he did the right bank of the river. When the disastrous result of the conflict of May 1st became known in Europe the friends of the Commander-in-Chief in the press declared that it was due to the failure of the officer in immediate command, General Sassulitch, to follow his instructions, which were to offer only a strategical resistance to the enemy and to withdraw slowly before the advance of a superior force upon Feng-haung-cheng, a position about thirty miles distant upon the Liau-yang road. If this explanation is correct, the activity shown by the Russians for weeks in constructing earthworks on the heights around Kiu-lien-cheng is rendered very remarkable, and equally difficult to understand is the size and importance of the force to which was apportioned the task of thus keeping in touch with the advancing Japanese army and conducting a mere strategic defeat. For General Sassulitch was commander of the 2nd Siberian Army Corps, and though the actual body of troops engaged in the fighting-line in resisting the passage of the Yalu by the Japanese did not amount to that strength, there is no doubt that General Sassulitch had under him in the near neighborhood a force of not less than 30,000 men. All the evidence, in fact, points to the conclusion that the Russian Generals, including the Commander-in-Chief himself, wholly underestimated the fighting power of the Japanese and the skill with which they would be led when the opposing armies came to close quarters. [Sidenote: Russian Confidence]