In these small but useful engagements the Guards suffered some slight casualties, nine men being slightly and sixteen seriously wounded. The 2nd Division sustained no casualties at all. The Russians, on the other hand, lost more heavily. They were seen to carry off a considerable number of dead and wounded, and they left behind them ninety-five dead horses, which, in itself, is significant of the searching character of the Japanese fire. The body of Lieutenant Senyoloff, commanding the Mounted Scouts of the 22nd Regiment, which his comrades had not time to remove, was buried at Wiju by the Japanese themselves with all honor. [Sidenote: Bridging the Yalu] On the following day the work of bridging the stream both at Kulido and Cheun-song-do was carried out, in spite of the intermittent fire which the Russian guns maintained upon the corps engaged. So ineffective indeed was this cannonade that the Japanese artillery did not even reply to it, and their engineers pursued their enterprise calmly and without substantial interruption. On the same day the naval squadron under Rear-Admiral Hosoya rendered valuable assistance to General Kuroki by its co-operation in the Yalu estuary. Two gunboats, two torpedo-boats, and two armed steamers ascended the river as far as Antushan and effected a useful diversion in the quarter by shelling the Russian entrenchments. The bombardment must have proved destructive, for after making a brisk reply for some time, which, however, did no damage to the Japanese ships, the Muscovite batteries were finally silenced. [Sidenote: Confusion in the Russian Councils] On Thursday, the 28th, the same tactics were displayed, and the position seized by the Guards' Division and the 2nd Division on the Islands of Kulido and Cheun-song-do was consolidated. Two companies of the former, indeed, crossed over to the mainland and reconnoitred Tiger Hill, encouraged by the silence of the enemy on that commanding eminence. To their surprise they found that the post had been evacuated by the Russians. No explanation has been offered of this remarkable step; the only conclusion possible--a conclusion, indeed, strengthened by subsequent events--is that confusion reigned in the councils of the Russian commanders, and that no definite and coherent plan had been thought out by them. For on the next day General Kashtalinsky was again ordered to occupy the hill, which the Japanese themselves, having other plans in view, were not yet in a position to seize effectively. [Sidenote: Kuroki's Consummate Strategy]