The book is really a study of the emotions rather than of character, and so we have to pay special attention to what the author has to say concerning them. As is well known, he formulated some years ago a special conception--it can hardly be called a theory--of the emotions, and the most novel part of the present work is the way in which this conception is expounded and elaborated in detail. He rejects the usual sense of the term in which it is taken to express a certain degree of elaboration of the affective aspect of the mind, and adopts a much wider definition in which the conative, affective, and cognitive aspects are all represented. "'Emotion' for us will connote not feeling abstracted from impulse, but feeling with its impulse, and feeling which has essentially a cognitive attitude, however vague, and frequently definite thoughts about its object." He distinguishes, none the less, between an emotion and the entire system to which it belongs. It is the part of the system that is present in consciousness, there being two other parts that are not; namely, the processes connected with it in the body, and the executive part concerned with its outward expression and modes of behaviour. The three main primary emotions are fear, anger, and disgust; other are curiosity, joy, sorrow, self-display, and self-abasement. The four emotional systems of anger, fear, joy and sorrow have an innate connection not only with one another, but also with every other primary system. Most of the book is taken up with a very detailed study of the emotions just enumerated, and in this study the author insists on the functional point of view, constantly enquiring into the dynamic aspects and tendencies of the emotion under consideration. This is perhaps the only respect in which it could be seen that the book was written within the last forty years. Mr. Shand's view of the relation between the emotions and the instincts has led to an animated controversy with Dr. McDougall, published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for 1914-1915. According to the latter writer, every emotion has a corresponding instinct, and is merely the affective aspect of this instinct. Mr. Shand, on the contrary, holds that there are vastly more instincts than emotions, that a given instinct may enter into several different emotional systems, and that each emotional system may at various times, and according to its needs, make use of almost any number of different instincts. The reviewer is unable to determine whether these different points of view have any further implications than a difference in the definitions adopted by the two writers. McDougall obviously employs the term instinct in a much more comprehensive and inclusive sense than Shand does.