There then follows a consideration of some general or nonspecific innate tendencies or pseudo-instincts which are not specific instincts with special accompanying emotions, and this leads to the analysis of sympathy or the sympathetic induction of emotion, suggestion and suggestibility, imitation, play, habit, disposition and temperament. The sentiments are now taken up for analysis and definition. A sentiment, according to McDougall, who accepts Shand's definition, is an organized system of emotional tendencies or dispositions centred about the idea of some object. Among the complex emotions not necessarily implying the existence of sentiments McDougall includes admiration, awe and reverence, gratitude, scorn, contempt and loathing, and envy. Among the complex emotions implying the existence of sentiments he considers reproach, anxiety, jealousy, vengeful emotion, resentment, shame, joy, sorrow and pity, happiness, surprise. The nature and the constitution of the sentiments and the complex emotions comes in for very illuminating analysis. The chapters on the growth of self-consciousness and of the self-regarding sentiment, the advance to the higher plane of social conduct, and volition are to be considered among the best chapters of this very excellent work. The discussion and analysis is very penetrating and clear. It is well worth while presenting the following abstract of the chapter on volition: All impulses, desires and aversions, motives or conations are of one of two classes: (1) from the excitement of some innate disposition or instinct; and (2) from excitement of dispositions acquired during the life of the individual by differentiation from the innate dispositions, under the guidance of pleasure and pain. When in the conflict of two motives the will is thrown on the side of one of them and we make a volitional decision, we in some way add to the energy with which the idea of the one desired end maintains itself in opposition to its rival. The idea of the self, or self-consciousness, is able to play its great role in volition only in virtue of the self-regarding sentiment. The conations, the desires and aversions, arising within this self-regarding sentiment are the motive forces which, adding themselves to the weaker ideal motive in the case of moral effort, enable it to win the mastery over some stronger, coarser desire of our primitive animal nature and to banish from consciousness the idea of the end of this desire.