If the factors of the two companies in Guinea found it impossible to reconcile their differences, the same observation may be made concerning Downing and DeWitt at The Hague. One is not inclined to excuse the deceit of the latter nor to sympathize with the apathetic neglect with which he met all English claims. On the other hand, Downing was perhaps the match for DeWitt in cunning and his master in argument. His contempt for the Dutch made it impossible for him to deal with them without gaining a complete victory. Compromise is the basis of most diplomacy, but such a word was scarcely in Downing's vocabulary. There were men in England who realized that Downing was slowly but surely leading the two countries into war. Clarendon reproved him for overzealousness; and Lord Hollis, the English ambassador in France, informed him that he saw no "causam belli, onely litigandi," and asked him if he could not temper his speech "by pouring in oyle & not vinegar," and thus prevent a war if possible.[139] In Downing's behalf it may be said, however, that his attitude was the same as that of the mercantile interests in England which he so well represented. The increasing importance of the mercantile element, both in England and Holland, and their desire to encroach on the trade of one another in all parts of the world, especially in Guinea, was responsible for the war.[140] When the war was inevitable, representatives of the English commercial interests assured the government of their loyal support and assistance.[141] As for the Dutch they, too, entered the conflict with high hopes for they did not fear Charles II as they had feared Cromwell.