Lincoln had some hesitation about signing this bill, however, for it had to be changed to conform to his views. But he signed it and also an anticipatory resolution of Congress to remedy its defects, placing himself on record by transmitting with his approval a copy of his intended veto, had certain defects remained. Mr. Lincoln objected to the expression that Congress could free a slave within a State, whereupon he suggested that it be changed to read that the ownership of the slave would be transferred to the nation, and that Congress would then liberate him.[32] The Democrats opposed this act, but antislavery opinion gained momentum by increasing accessions to the ranks of freedom and by that unusual ability of the highly talented patriotic membership of Congress. Yet to the proslavery element and the conservative Unionists, Lincoln's proposal of gradual compensated emancipation was a daring innovation upon practical politics. "In point of fact," say Nicolay and Hay, "the President stood sagaciously midway between headlong reform and blind reaction. His steady, cautious direction and control of the average public sentiment of the country alike held back rash experiment and spurred lagging opinion."[33] Four months after Lincoln's proposal of compensated emancipation to the border slave States and its sanction by Congress, the situation seeming more complicated by the vicissitudes of war, Lincoln saw the necessity for uniting the sentiment of the North for a practical solution of the slavery problem. Looking forward into the future, therefore, Lincoln readily realized that the North must present a united front contending for a plain, practical policy, relative to things both political and military. Consequently he again met the border State delegations on July 12, and made a second appeal to them to accept compensation for the emancipation of the slaves in their respective States while the opportunity was yet at hand.[34] He pointed out to them that the war would have been ended, had they considered the acceptance of the provisions of his first appeal for gradual emancipation, and that this plan would not be a slow and weak means of ending the war. Dissuading them from secession, he failed not to apprise them of the fact that, if the rebellion continued, their institution would be destroyed without any sort of indemnity or reparation. Again he referred to his revoking General Hunter's proclamation of military abolition, with the hope that he might possibly win them over to his plan, but his effort was futile. Most of them replied with a qualified refusal; twenty of them later presented a written reply, pledging themselves to continue loyal, but at the same time giving the reasons why they could not accept the plan of compensated emancipation.