The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867Various
Philosophy
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
The proposed question, how is a being for us possible? abstracts itself
from all being; i. e. it must not be understood, as if the question
posited a not-being; for in that case the conception of being would only
be negated, but not abstracted from. On the contrary, the question does
not entertain the conception of being at all, either positively or
negatively. The proposed question asks for the ground of the predicate
of being, whether it be applied positively or negatively; but all ground
lies beyond the grounded, i. e. is opposed to it. The answer must,
therefore, if it is to be an answer to this question, also abstract from
all being. To maintain, _a priori_, in advance of an attempt, that such
an abstraction is impossible in the answer, because it is impossible in
itself, would be to maintain likewise, that such an abstraction is
impossible in the question; and hence, that the question itself is not
possible, and that the problem of a science of metaphysics, as the
science which is to solve the problem of the ground of being for us, is
not a problem for human reason.
That such an abstraction, and hence such a question, is contrary to
reason, cannot be proven by objective grounds to those who maintain its
possibility; for the latter assert that the possibility and necessity of
the question is grounded upon the highest law of reason—that of
self-determination, (Practical legislation,) under which all other laws
of reason are subsumed, and from which they are all derived, but at the
same time determined and limited to the sphere of their validity. They
acknowledge the arguments of their opponents willingly enough, but deny
their application to the present case; with what justice, their
opponents can determine only by placing themselves upon the basis of
this highest law, but hence, also, upon the basis of an answer to the
disputed question, by which act they would cease to be opponents. Their
opposition, indeed, can only arise from a subjective defect—from the
consciousness that they never raised this question, and never felt the
need of an answer to it. Against this their position, no objective
grounds can, on the other hand, be made valid, by those who insist on an
answer to the question; for the doubt, which raises that question, is
grounded upon previous acts of freedom, which no demonstration can
compel from any one.
III.
Let us now ask: Who is it that undertakes the demanded abstraction from
all being? or, in which of the two series does it occur? Evidently, in
the series of philosophical argumentation, for another series does not
exist.
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