The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867Various
Philosophy
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
28. In men as in brutes, the consecutiveness of their perceptions is due
to the principle of memory—like empirics in medicine, who have only
practice without theory. And we are mere empirics in three-fourths of
our acts. For example, when we expect that the sun will rise to-morrow,
we judge so empirically, because it has always risen hitherto. Only the
astronomer judges by an act of reason.
29. But the cognition of necessary and eternal truths is that which
distinguishes us from mere animals. It is this which gives us Reason and
Science, and raises us to the knowledge of ourselves and of God; and it
is this in us which we call a reasonable soul or spirit.
30. It is also by the cognition of necessary truths, and by their
abstractions, that we rise to acts of reflection, which give us the idea
of that which calls itself “I,” and which lead us to consider that this
or that is in us. And thus, while thinking of ourselves, we think of
Being, of substance, simple or compound, of the immaterial, and of God
himself. We conceive that that which in us is limited, is in him without
limit. And these reflective acts furnish the principal objects of our
reasonings.
31. Our reasonings are founded on two great principles, that of
“_Contradiction_,” by virtue of which we judge that to be false which
involves contradiction, and that to be true which is opposed to, or
which contradicts the false.
32. And that of the “_Sufficient Reason_,” by virtue of which we judge
that no fact can be real or existent, no statement true, unless there be
a sufficient reason why it is thus, and not otherwise, although these
reasons very often cannot be known to us.
33. There are also two sorts of truths—those of reasoning and those of
fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary, and their opposite is
impossible; those of fact are contingent, and their opposite is
possible. When a truth is necessary, we may discover the reason of it by
analysis, resolving it into simpler ideas and truths, until we arrive at
those which are ultimate.[3]
34. It is thus that mathematicians by analysis reduce speculative
theorems and practical canons to definitions, axioms and postulates.
35. And finally, there are simple ideas of which no definition can be
given; there are also axioms and postulates,—in one word, _ultimate
principles_, which cannot and need not be proved. And these are
“Identical Propositions,” of which the opposite contains an express
contradiction.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account