designate it, (unless you wish to take the expression “_Pure apperception_” for such a designation). Nevertheless, it can be clearly shown where in Kant’s System it ought to have been mentioned. I hope that the _categorical imperative_ of Kant occurs in consciousness, according to his System. Now what sort of consciousness is this of the categorical imperative? This question Kant never proposed to himself, because he never treated of the basis of _all_ Philosophy. In his _Critique of Pure Reason_ he treated only of theoretical Philosophy, and could therefore not introduce the categorical imperative; in his _Critique of Practical Reason_, he treated only of practical Philosophy, wherein the question concerning the manner of consciousness could not arise. This consciousness is doubtless an immediate, but no sensuous consciousness—hence exactly what I call intellectual contemplation. Now, since we have no classical author in Philosophy, I give it the latter name, with the same right with which Kant gives it to something else, which is a mere nothing; and with the same right I insist that people ought first to become acquainted with the significance of my terminology before proceeding to judge my system. My most estimable friend, the Rev. Mr. Schulz—to whom I had made known my indefinite idea of building up the whole Science of Philosophy on the pure Ego, long before I had thoroughly digested that idea, and whom I found less opposed to it than any one else—has a remarkable passage on this subject. In his review of Kant’s _Critique of Pure Reason_, he says: “The pure, active self-consciousness, in which really every one’s Ego consists, must not be confounded—for the very reason because it can and must teach us in an immediate manner—with the _power of contemplation_, and must not be made to involve the doctrine that we are in possession of a _supersensuous, intellectual power of contemplation_. For we call _contemplation_ a _representation_, which is _immediately_ related to an object. But pure self-consciousness is not representation, but is rather that which first makes a representation to become really a representation. If I say, ‘I represent something to myself,’ it signifies just the same as if I said, ‘I am conscious that I have a representation of this object.’”