The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867Various
Philosophy
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
But to state it tersely: what is really the Science of Knowledge in two
words? It is this: Reason is absolutely self-determined; Reason is only
for Reason; but for Reason there is also nothing but Reason. Hence,
everything, which Reason is, must be grounded in itself, and out of
itself, but not in or out of another—some external other, which it could
never grasp without giving up itself. In short, the Science of Knowledge
is transcendental idealism. Again, what is the content of the Kantian
system in two words? I confess that I cannot conceive it possible how
any one can understand even one sentence of Kant, and harmonize it with
others, except on the same presupposition which the Science of Knowledge
has just asserted. I believe that that presupposition is the everlasting
refrain of his system; and I confess that one of the reasons why I
refused to prove the agreement of the Science of Knowledge with Kant’s
system was this: It appeared to me somewhat too ridiculous and too
tedious to show up the forest by pointing out the several trees in it.
I will cite here one chief passage from Kant. He says: “The highest
principle of the possibility of all contemplation in relation to the
understanding is this: that all the manifold be subject to the
conditions of the original unity of apperception.” That is to say, in
other words, “That something which is contemplated be also _thought_, is
only possible on condition that the possibility of the original unity of
apperception can coexist with it.” Now since, according to Kant,
contemplation also is possible only on condition that it be thought and
comprehended—otherwise it would remain blind—and since contemplation
itself is thus subject to the conditions of the possibility of
thinking—it follows that, according to Kant, not only Thinking
immediately, but by the mediation of thinking, contemplation also, and
hence _all consciousness_, is subject to the conditions of the original
unity of apperception.
Now, what is this condition? It is true, Kant speaks of conditions, but
he states only one as a fundamental condition. What is this condition of
the original unity of apperception? It is this (see § 16 of the
_Critique of Pure Reason_), “that my representations _can_ be
accompanied by the ‘_I_ think’”—the word “_I_” alone is italicised by
Kant, and this is somewhat important; that is to say, _I am the
thinking_ in this thinking.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account