But some one might wish to weaken this argument by the following distinction: It is one thing to _condition_, and another to _determine_. According to Kant, all consciousness is only _conditioned_ by self-consciousness; i. e. the _content_ of that consciousness may have its ground in something else than self-consciousness; provided the results of that grounding do not _contradict_ the conditions of self-consciousness; those results need not _proceed_ from self-consciousness, provided they do not cancel its possibility. But, according to the Science of Knowledge, all consciousness is _determined_ through self-consciousness; i. e. everything which occurs in consciousness is _grounded_, _given_ and _produced_ by the conditions of self-consciousness, and a ground of the same in something other than self-consciousness does not exist at all. Now, to meet this argument, I must show that in the present case the _determinateness_ follows immediately from the _conditionedness_, and that, therefore, the distinction drawn between both is not valid in this instance. Whosoever says, “All consciousness is conditioned by the possibility of self-consciousness, _and as such I now propose to consider it_,” knows in this his investigation, nothing more concerning consciousness, and abstracts from everything he may believe, further to know concerning it. He deduces what is required from the asserted principle, and only what he thus has _deduced_ as consciousness is for him consciousness, and everything else is and remains nothing. Thus the derivability from self-consciousness _determines_ for him the extent of that which he holds to be consciousness, because he starts from the presupposition that all consciousness is _conditioned_ by the possibility of self-consciousness.