I am reminded of a chief distinction which is said to exist between the Science of Knowledge and Kant’s system, and a distinction which but recently has been again insisted upon by a man who is justly supposed to have understood Kant, and who has shown that he also has understood the Science of Knowledge. This man is Reinhold, who, in a late essay, in endeavoring to prove that I have done injustice to _myself_, and to other successful students of Kant’s writings—in stating what I have just now reiterated and proved, i. e. that Kant’s system and the Science of Knowledge are the same—proceeds to remark: “The _ground_ of our assertion, that there is an external something corresponding to our representations, is most certainly held by the _Critique of Pure Reason_ to be contained in the Ego; but only in so far as _empirical knowledge_ (experience) has taken place in the Ego as a fact; that is to say, the _Critique of Pure Reason_ holds that this empirical knowledge has its ground in the pure Ego only in relation to its _transcendental content_, which is the _form_ of that knowledge; but in regard to its _empirical_ content, which gives that knowledge objective validity, it is grounded in the Ego through a something _which is not the Ego_. Now, a scientific form of philosophy was not possible so long as that something, which is not Ego, was looked for outside of the Ego as ground of the objective reality of the transcendental content of the Ego.” Thus Reinhold. I have not convinced my readers, or demonstrated my proof, until I have met this objection. The (purely historical) question is this: Has Kant really placed the ground of experience (in its empirical content) _in a something different from the Ego_? I know very well that all the Kantians, except Mr. Beck, whose work appeared after the publication of the Science of Knowledge, have really understood Kant to say this. Nay, the last interpreter of Kant, Mr. Schulz, whom Kant himself has endorsed, thus interprets him. How often does Mr. Schulz admit that _the objective ground of the appearances is contained in something which is a thing in itself_, &c., &c. We have just seen how Reinhold also interprets Kant. Now it may seem presumptuous for one man to arise and say: “Up to this moment, amongst a number of worthy scholars who have devoted their time and energies to the interpretation of a certain book, not a single one has understood that book otherwise than _utterly falsely_; they all have discovered in that system the very doctrine which it refutes—dogmatism, instead of transcendental idealism; _and I alone understand it rightly_.” Yet this presumption might be but seemingly so; for it is to be hoped that other persons will adopt that one man’s views, and that, therefore, he will not always stand alone. There are other reasons why it is not very presumptuous to contradict the whole number of Kantians, but I will not mention them here.