The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867Various
Philosophy
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
If, however, the being, of their above assertion, is to mean not a _mere
ideal_, but a _real_ being, i. e. a something, limiting not only the
ideal, but also the actually productive, the practical activity of the
Ego—that is to say, a something permanent in time and persistent in
space—then that assertion of theirs is unwarranted. If it were correct,
no science of philosophy were possible, for the conception of the Ego
would be unthinkable; and self-consciousness, nay, even consciousness,
would also be impossible. If it were correct, we, it is true, should be
compelled to stop philosophizing; but this would be no gain to them, for
they would also have to stop refuting us. But do they not themselves
repudiate the correctness of their assertion? Do they not think
themselves every moment of their life as free and as having causality?
Do they not, for instance, think themselves the free, active authors of
the very sensible and very original objections, which they bring up from
time to time against our system? Now, is then this “themselves”
something which checks and limits their causality, or is it not rather
the very opposite of the check, namely, the very causality itself? I
must refer them to what I have said in § v. on this subject. If such a
sort of being were ascribed to the Ego, the Ego would cease to be Ego;
it would become a _thing_, and its conception would be annihilated. It
is true that afterwards—not afterwards as a posteriority in time, but
afterwards in the series of the dependence of thinking—we also ascribe
such a being to the Ego, which, nevertheless, remains and must remain
Ego in the original meaning of the word; this being consisting partly of
extension and persistency in space, _and in this respect it becomes a
body_, and partly identity and permanency in time, and in this respect
it becomes a soul. But it is the business of philosophy to prove, and
genetically to explain how the Ego comes to think itself thus, and all
this belongs not to that which is presupposed, but to that which is to
be deduced. The result, therefore, remains thus: the Ego is originally
only an act_ing_; if you but think it as an act_ive_, you have already
an Empirical, and hence a conception of it, which must first be
deduced.[9]
But our opponents claim that they do not make their assertion without
all proof; they want to prove it by logic, and, if God is willing, by
the logical proposition of contradiction.
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