The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867Various
Philosophy
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
But certainly if they have not yet elevated themselves to _the
consciousness_ of that contemplation, which is not determined by the
predicate of being, (for that they should unconsciously possess that
contemplation itself, Reason herself has taken care of,) then _all
their_ conceptions, which can be derived only from sensuous
contemplation, are very properly determined by the predicate of this
actual being. In that case, however, they must not believe that logic
has taught them this asserted connection of thinking and being, for
their knowledge of it is altogether derived from their unfortunate
empirical self. They, standing on the standpoint of knowing no other
conceptions than those derived from sensuous contemplation, would, of
course, contradict _themselves_ if they were to think one of _their_
conceptions without the predicate of actual being. We, on our part, are
also well content to let them retain this rule for themselves, since it
is most assuredly universally valid for the whole sphere of _their_
possible thinking; and to let them always carefully keep an eye on this
rule, so that they may not violate it. As for ourselves, however, we
cannot use this their rule any longer, for we possess a few conceptions
more, resting in a sphere over which their rule does not extend, and
about which they can speak nothing, since it does not exist for them.
Let them, therefore, attend to their own business hereafter, and leave
us to attend to ours. Even in so far as we grant them the rule, namely,
that every thinking must have an object of thinking; it is by no means a
logical rule, but rather one which logic presupposes, and through which
logic first becomes possible. _To think_, is the same as to determine
objects; both conceptions are identical; logic furnishes the _rules_ of
this determining, and hence presupposes clearly enough the determining
generally as a part of consciousness. That all thinking has an object
can be shown only in contemplation. Think! and observe in this thinking
how you do it, and you will doubtless find that you oppose to your
thinking an object of this thinking.
Another objection, somewhat related to the above, is this: If you do not
proceed from a being, how can you, without being illogical, deduce a
being? You will never be able to get anything else out of what you take
in hand than what is already contained in it, unless you proceed
dishonestly and use juggler tricks.
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