The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867Various
Philosophy
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
Here is the corner stone of Kant’s realism. I _must think_ something
as thing in itself, i. e. as independent of _me, the empirical_,
whenever I occupy the standpoint of the empirical; and because I _must
think_ so, I never become conscious of this activity in my thinking,
_since it is not free_. Only when I occupy the standpoint of
philosophy can I _draw the conclusion_ that I am active in this
thinking.
Footnote 9:
To state the main point in a few words: _All being_ signifies a
_limitation of free activity_. Now this activity is regarded _either_
as that of the mere intelligence, and then that which is posited as
limiting this activity has a mere _ideal being, mere objectivity in
regard to consciousness_.—This objectivity is in every representation
(even in that of the Ego, of virtue, of the moral law, &c., or in that
of complete phantasms, as, for instance, a squared circle, a sphynx,
&c.) _object of the mere representation_. Or the free activity is
regarded as _having actual causality_; and then that which limits it,
has _actual_ existence, the _real world_.
Footnote 10:
I have repeated this frequently. I have stated that I could absolutely
have no point in common with certain philosophers, and that they are
not, and cannot be, where I am. This seems to have been taken rather
for an hyperbole, uttered in indignation, than for real earnest; for
they do not cease to repeat their demand: “Prove _to us_ thy
doctrine!” I must solemnly assure them that I was perfectly serious in
that statement, that it is my deliberate and decided conviction.
Dogmatism proceeds from a _being_ as the Absolute, and hence its
system never rises above being. Idealism knows no being, as something
for itself existing. In other words: Dogmatism proceeds from
necessity—Idealism from freedom. They are, therefore, in two utterly
different worlds.
INTRODUCTION TO IDEALISM.
[From the German of SCHELLING. Translated by TOM DAVIDSON.]
I.—IDEA OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
1. All knowing is based upon the agreement of an objective with a
subjective. For we _know_ only the true, and truth is universally held
to be the agreement of representations with their objects.
2. The sum of all that is purely objective in our knowledge we may call
Nature; while the sum of all that is subjective may be designated the
_Ego_, or Intelligence. These two concepts are mutually opposed.
Intelligence is originally conceived as that which solely
represents—Nature as that which is merely capable of representation; the
former as the conscious—the latter as the unconscious. There is,
moreover, necessary in all knowledge a mutual agreement of the two—the
conscious and the unconscious _per se_. The problem is to explain this
agreement.
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