The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867Various
Philosophy
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
3. But this movement is short. The ideal style passes quickly to the
graceful, to the agreeable. Here appears an aim different from that of
the realization of the beautiful, which pure art ought to propose to
itself, to wit: the intention of pleasing, of producing an impression on
the soul. Hence arise works of a style elaborate with art, and a certain
seeking for external embellishments. The subject is no more the
principal thing. The attention of the artist is distracted by ornaments
and accessories—by the decorations, the trimmings, the simpering airs,
the attitudes and graceful postures, or the vivid colors and the
attractive forms, the luxury of ornaments and draperies, the learned
making of verse. But the general effect remains without grandeur and
without nobleness. Beautiful proportions and grand masses give place to
moderate dimensions, or are masked with ornaments. The graceful style
begets the style _for effect_, which is an exaggeration of it. The art
then becomes altogether conspicuous; it calls the attention of the
spectator by everything that can strike the senses. The artist
surrenders to it his personal ends and his design. In this species of
_tête-à-tête_ with the public, there is betrayed through all, the desire
of exhibiting his wit, of attracting admiration for his ability, his
skill, his power of execution. This art—without naturalness, full of
coquetry, of artifice and affectation, the opposite of the severe style
which yields nothing to the public—is the style of the epochs of
decadence. Frequently it has recourse to a last artifice, to the
affectation of profundity and of simplicity, which is then only
obscurity, a mysterious profundity which conceals an absence of ideas
and a real impotence. This air of mystery, which parades itself, is in
its turn, hardly better than coquetry; the principle is the same—the
desire of producing an effect.
The author then passes to the _Division of the Arts_. The common method
classes them according to their means of representation, and the senses
to which they are addressed. Two senses only are affected by the
perception of the beautiful: _sight_, which perceives forms and colors,
and _hearing_, which perceives sounds. Hence the division into _arts of
design_ and _musical art_. _Poetry_, which employs speech, and addresses
itself to the imagination, forms a domain apart. Without discarding this
division, Hegel combines it with another more philosophical principle of
classification, and one which is taken no longer from the external means
of art, but from their internal relation to the very content of the
ideas which it is to represent.
Art has for object the representation of the ideal. The arts ought then
to be classed according to the measure in which they are more or less
capable of expressing it. This gradation will have at the same time the
advantage of corresponding to historic progress, and to the fundamental
forms of art previously studied.
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