The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867Various
Philosophy
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
In this manner Dogmatism proceeds everywhere, whatever phase it may
assume. In the immense gulf, which in that system remains always open
between Things and Representations, it places a few empty words instead
of an explanation, which words may certainly be committed to memory, but
in saying which nobody has ever yet thought, nor ever will think,
anything. For whenever one attempts to think the manner in which is
accomplished what Dogmatism asserts to be accomplished, the whole idea
vanishes into empty foam. Hence Dogmatism can only repeat its principle,
and repeat it in different forms; can only assert and re-assert the same
thing; but it cannot proceed from what it asserts to what is to be
explained, nor ever deduce the one from the other. But in this deduction
Philosophy consists. Hence Dogmatism, even when viewed from a
speculative stand-point, is no Philosophy at all, but merely an impotent
assertion. Idealism is the only possible remaining Philosophy. What we
have here said can meet with no objection; but it may well meet with
incapability of understanding it. That all influences are of a
mechanical nature, and that no mechanism can produce a representation,
nobody will deny, who but understands the words. But this is the very
difficulty. It requires a certain degree of independence and freedom of
spirit to comprehend the nature of the intelligence, which we have
described, and upon which our whole refutation of Dogmatism is founded.
Many persons have not advanced further with their Thinking than to
comprehend the simple chain of natural mechanism, and very naturally,
therefore, the Representation, if they choose to think it at all,
belongs, in their eyes, to the same chain of which alone they have any
knowledge. The Representation thus becomes to them a sort of Thing of
which we have divers examples in some of the most celebrated
philosophical writers. For such persons Dogmatism is sufficient: for
them there is no gulf, since the opposite does not exist for them at
all. Hence you cannot convince the Dogmatist by the proof just stated,
however clear it may be, for you cannot bring the proof to his
knowledge, since he lacks the power to comprehend it.
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