The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867Various
Philosophy
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
Moreover, the manner in which Dogmatism is treated here, is opposed to
the mild way of thinking which characterizes our age, and which, though
it has been extensively accepted in all ages, has never been converted
to an express principle except in ours; i. e. that philosophers must not
be so strict in their logic; in philosophy one should not be so
particular as, for instance, in Mathematics. If persons of this mode of
thinking see but a few links of the chain and the rule, according to
which conclusions are drawn, they at once fill up the remaining part
through their imagination, never investigating further of what they may
consist. If, for instance, an Alexander Von Ioch tells them: “All things
are determined by natural necessity; now our representations depend upon
the condition of Things, and our will depends upon our representations:
hence all our will is determined by natural necessity, and our opinion
of a free will is mere deception!”—then these people think it mightily
comprehensible and clear, although there is no sense in it; and they go
away convinced and satisfied at the stringency of this his
demonstration.
I must call to mind, that the Science of Knowledge does not proceed from
this mild way of thinking, nor calculate upon it. If only a single link
in the long chain it has to draw does not fit closely to the following,
this Science does not pretend to have established anything.
VII. Idealism, as we have said above, explains the determinations of
consciousness from the activity of the Intelligence, which, in its view,
is only active and absolute, not passive; since it is postulated as the
first and highest, preceded by nothing, which might explain its
passivity. From the same reason actual _Existence_ cannot well be
ascribed to the Intelligence, since such Existence is the result of
reciprocal causality, but there is nothing wherewith the Intelligence
might be placed in reciprocal causality. From the view of Idealism, the
Intelligence is a _Doing_, and absolutely nothing else; it is even wrong
to call it _an Active_, since this expression points to something
existing, in which the activity is inherent.
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