The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867Various
Philosophy
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
But to assume anything of this kind is against the principle of
Idealism, which proposes to deduce all other things from the
Intelligence. Now certain _determined_ representations—as, for instance,
of a world, of a material world in space, existing without any work of
our own—are to be deduced from the action of the Intelligence; but you
cannot deduce anything determined from an undetermined; the form of all
deductions, the category of ground and sequence, is not applicable here.
Hence the action of the Intelligence, which is made the ground, must be
a _determined_ action, and since the action of the Intelligence itself
is the highest ground of explanation, that action must be so determined
_by the Intelligence itself_, and not by anything foreign to it. Hence
the presupposition of Idealism will be this: the Intelligence acts, but
by its very essence it can only act in a certain manner. If this
necessary manner of its action is considered apart from the action, it
may properly be called Laws of Action. Hence, there are necessary laws
of the Intelligence.
This explains also, at the same time, the feeling of necessity which
accompanies the determined representations; the Intelligence experiences
in those cases, not an impression from without, but feels in its action
the limits of its own Essence. In so far as Idealism makes this only
reasonable and really explanatory presupposition of necessary laws of
the Intelligence, it is called _Critical_ or _Transcendental Idealism_.
A transcendent Idealism would be a system which were to undertake a
deduction of determined representations from the free and perfectly
lawless action of the Intelligence: an altogether contradictory
presupposition, since, as we have said above, the category of ground and
sequence is not applicable in that case.
The laws of action of the Intelligence, as sure as they are to be
founded in the one nature of the Intelligence, constitute in themselves
a system; that is to say, the fact that the Intelligence acts in this
particular manner under this particular condition _is_ explainable, and
explainable because under a condition it has always a determined mode of
action, which again is explainable from _one_ highest fundamental law.
In the course of its action the Intelligence gives itself its own laws;
and this legislation itself is done by virtue of a higher necessary
action or Representation. For instance: the law of Causality is not a
first original law, but only one of the many modes of combining the
manifold, and to be deduced from the fundamental law of this
combination; this law of combining the manifold is again, like the
manifold itself, to be deduced from higher laws.
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