The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867Various
Philosophy
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
The uninitiated regards the philosophic treatment of a theme as
difficult solely by reason of its technical terms. “If I only understood
your use of words, I think I should find no difficulty in your thought.”
He supposes that under those bizarre terms there lurks only the meaning
that he and others put into ordinary phrases. He does not seem to think
that the concepts likewise are new. It is just as though an Indian were
to say to the carpenter, “I could make as good work as you, if I only
had the secret of using my finger-nails and teeth as you do the plane
and saw.” Speculative philosophy—it cannot be too early inculcated—does
_not_ “conceal under cumbrous terminology views which men ordinarily
hold.” The ordinary reflection would say that Being is the ground of
thought, while speculative philosophy would say that thought is the
ground of Being; whether of other being, or of itself as being—for it is
_causa sui_.
Let us now address ourselves to the task of elaborating our
technique—the tools of thought—and see what new worlds become accessible
through our mental telescopes and microscopes, our analytical scalpels
and psychological plummets.
I.—A PRIORI AND A POSTERIORI.
_A priori_, as applied to knowledge, signifies that which belongs to the
nature of the mind itself. Knowledge which is before experience, or not
dependent on it, is _a priori_.
_A posteriori_ or _empirical_ knowledge is derived from experience.
A criterion to be applied in order to test the application of these
categories to any knowledge in question, is to be found in
_universality_ and _necessity_. If the truth expressed has universal and
necessary validity it must be _a priori_, for it could not have been
derived from experience. Of empirical knowledge we can only say: “It is
true so far as experience has extended.” Of _a priori_ knowledge, on the
contrary, we affirm: “It is universally and necessarily true and no
experience of its opposite can possibly occur; from the very nature of
things it must be so.”
II.—ANALYTICAL AND SYNTHETICAL.
A judgment which, in the predicate, adds nothing new to the subject, is
said to be _analytical_, as e. g. “Horse is an animal;”—the concept
“animal” is already contained in that of “horse.”
_Synthetical_ judgments, on the contrary, add in the predicate something
new to the conception of the subject, as e. g. “This rose is red,” or
“The shortest distance between two points is a straight line;”—in the
first judgment we have “red” added to the general concept “rose;” while
in the second example we have _straightness_, which is quality, added to
_shortest_, which is quantity.
III.—APODEICTICAL.
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