The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1Madison, James
History
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1
Madison, James
Constitutional law -- United States; Constitutions -- United States; United States. Constitution
6. Will it secure the Union ag^{st} the influence of foreign powers over
its members. He pretended not to say that any such influence had yet
been tried: but it was naturally to be expected that occasions would
produce it. As lessons which claimed particular attention, he cited the
intrigues practised among the Amphyctionic Confederates first by the
Kings of Persia, and afterwards fatally by Philip of Macedon: Among the
Achæans, first by Macedon & afterwards no less fatally by Rome: among
the Swiss by Austria, France & the lesser neighbouring powers: among the
members of the Germanic Body by France, England, Spain & Russia--And in
the Belgic Republic, by all the great neighbouring powers. The plan of
M^r Patterson, not giving to the general Councils any negative on the
will of the particular States, left the door open for the like
pernicious Machinations among ourselves.
7. He begged the smaller States which were most attached to M^r
Patterson's plan to consider the situation in which it would leave them.
In the first place they would continue to bear the whole expence of
maintaining their Delegates in Congress. It ought not to be said that if
they were willing to bear this burthen, no others had a right to
complain. As far as it led the small States to forbear keeping up a
representation, by which the public business was delayed, it was
evidently a matter of common concern. An examination of the minutes of
Congress would satisfy every one that the public business had been
frequently delayed by this cause; and that the States most frequently
unrepresented in Cong^s were not the larger States. He reminded the
Convention of another consequence of leaving on a small State the burden
of maintaining a Representation in Cong^s. During a considerable period
of the War, one of the Representatives of Delaware, in whom alone before
the signing of the Confederation the entire vote of that State and after
that event one half of its vote, frequently resided, was a Citizen &
Resident of Pen^a and held an office in his own State incompatible with
an appointment from it to Cong^s. During another period, the same State
was represented by three delegates two of whom were citizens of Penn^a
and the third a Citizen of New Jersey. These expedients must have been
intended to avoid the burden of supporting Delegates from their own
State. But whatever might have been y^e cause, was not in effect the
vote of one State doubled, and the influence of another increased by it?
In the 2^d place the coercion, on which the efficacy of the plan
depends, can never be exerted but on themselves. The larger States will
be impregnable, the smaller only can feel the vengeance of it. He
illustrated the position by the history of the Amphyctionic
confederates: and the ban of the German Empire. It was the cobweb w^{ch}
could entangle the weak, but would be the sport of the strong.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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