The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1Madison, James
History
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1
Madison, James
Constitutional law -- United States; Constitutions -- United States; United States. Constitution
than one branch in the Legislature. Their constitutions accord so
generally in both these circumstances, that they seem almost to have
been preconcerted. This must either have been a miracle, or have
resulted from the genius of the people. The only exceptions to the
establishm^t of two branches in the Legislatures are the State of P^a &
Cong^s and the latter the only single one not chosen by the people
themselves. What has been the consequence? The people have been
constantly averse to giving that Body further powers--It was
acknowledged by (M^r Patterson) that his plan could not be enforced
without military coercion. Does he consider the force of this
concession. The most jarring elements of Nature; fire & water themselves
are not more incompatible that[n] such a mixture of civil liberty and
military execution. Will the militia march from one State to another, in
order to collect the arrears of taxes from the delinquent members of the
Republic? Will they maintain an army for this purpose? Will not the
Citizens of the invaded State assist one another till they rise as one
Man, and shake off the Union altogether. Rebellion is the only case, in
which the military force of the State can be properly exerted ag^{st}
its Citizens. In one point of view he was struck with horror at the
prospect of recurring to this expedient. To punish the non-payment of
taxes with death, was a severity not yet adopted by despotism itself:
yet this unexampled cruelty would be mercy compared to a military
collection of revenue, in which the bayonet could make no discrimination
between the innocent and the guilty. He took this occasion to repeat,
that notwithstanding his solicitude to establish a national Government,
he never would agree to abolish the State Gov^{ts} or render them
absolutely insignificant. They were as necessary as the Gen^l Gov^t and
he would be equally careful to preserve them. He was aware of the
difficulty of drawing the line between them, but hoped it was not
insurmountable. The Convention, tho' comprising so many distinguished
characters, could not be expected to make a faultless Gov^t. And he
would prefer trusting to Posterity the amendment of its defects, rather
than to push the experiment too far.
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