The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1Madison, James
History
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1
Madison, James
Constitutional law -- United States; Constitutions -- United States; United States. Constitution
Col. Mason observed that a vote had already passed he found [he was out
at the time] for vesting the executive powers in a single person. Among
these powers was that of appointing to offices in certain cases. The
probable abuses of a negative had been well explained by D^r F. as
proved by experience, the best of all tests. Will not the same door be
opened here. The Executive may refuse its assent to necessary measures
till new appointments shall be referred to him; and having by degrees
engrossed these into all his own hands, the American Executive, like the
British, will by bribery & influence, save himself the trouble & odium
of exerting his negative afterwards. We are M^r Chairman going very far
in this business. We are not indeed constituting a British Government,
but a more dangerous monarchy, an elective one. We are introducing a new
principle into our system, and not necessary as in the British Gov^t
where the Executive has greater rights to defend. Do gentlemen mean to
pave the way to hereditary Monarchy? Do they flatter themselves that the
people will ever consent to such an innovation? If they do I venture to
tell them, they are mistaken. The people never will consent. And do
gentlemen consider the danger of delay, and the still greater danger of
a rejection, not for a moment but forever, of the plan which shall be
proposed to them. Notwithstanding the oppression & injustice experienced
among us from democracy; the genius of the people is in favor of it, and
the genius of the people must be consulted. He could not but consider
the federal system as in effect dissolved by the appointment of this
Convention to devise a better one. And do gentlemen look forward to the
dangerous interval between extinction of an old, and the establishment
of a new Governm^t and to the scenes of confusion which may ensue. He
hoped that nothing like a Monarchy would ever be attempted in this
Country. A hatred to its oppressions had carried the people through the
late Revolution. Will it not be eno' to enable the Executive to suspend
offensive laws, till they shall be coolly revised, and the objections to
them overruled by a greater majority than was required in the first
instance. He never could agree to give up all the rights of the people
to a single magistrate: If more than one had been fixed on, greater
powers might have been entrusted to the Executive. He hoped this attempt
to give such powers would have its weight hereafter as an argument for
increasing the number of the Executive.
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