The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 2Madison, James
History
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 2
Madison, James
Constitutional law -- United States; Constitutions -- United States; United States. Constitution
"In all Gov^{ts} there is a power which is capable of
oppressive exercise. In Monarchies and Aristocracies
oppression proceeds from a want of sympathy & responsibility
in the Gov^t towards the people. In popular Governments the
danger lies in an undue sympathy among individuals composing
a majority, and a want of responsibility in the majority to
the minority. The characteristic excellence of the political
System of the U. S. arises from a distribution and
organization of its powers, which at the same time that they
secure the dependence of the Gov^t on the will of the
nation, provides better guards than are found in any other
popular Gov^t against interested combinations of a Majority
against the rights of a Minority.
"The U. States have a precious advantage also in the actual
distribution of property particularly the landed property;
and in the universal hope of acquiring property. This latter
peculiarity is among the happiest contrasts in their
situation to that of the old world, where no anticipated
change in this respect, can generally inspire a like
sympathy with the rights of property. There may be at
present, a Majority of the Nation, who are even freeholders,
or the heirs or aspirants to Freeholds. And the day may not
be very near when such will cease to make up a Majority of
the community. But they cannot always so continue. With
every admissible subdivision of the Arable lands, a
populousness not greater than that of England or France will
reduce the holders to a Minority. And whenever the majority
shall be without landed or other equivalent property and
without the means or hope of acquiring it, what is to secure
the rights of property ag^{st} the danger from an equality &
universality of suffrage, vesting compleat power over
property in hands without a share in it: not to speak of a
danger in the meantime from a dependence of an increasing
number on the wealth of a few? In other Countries this
dependence results in some from the relations between
Landlords & Tenants in others both from that source & from
the relations between wealthy capitalists and indigent
labourers. In the U. S. the occurrence must happen from the
last source; from the connection between the great
Capitalists in Manufactures & Commerce and the numbers
employed by them. Nor will accumulations of Capital for a
certain time be precluded by our laws of descent & of
distribution; Such being the enterprise inspired by free
Institutions, that great wealth in the hands of individuals
and associations may not be unfrequent. But it may be
observed, that the opportunities may be diminished, and the
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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