One of the results of Bethmann's marked inclination toward control was that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was, under him, a mere helper, so much so that the Foreign Office was almost affiliated with the office of the Chancellor, a state of affairs that made itself felt most especially in the use made of the press department. Bethmann likewise asserted his independence decidedly in his relations with me. Basing himself upon the fact that, constitutionally, the Chancellor alone is responsible for foreign policy, he ruled as he pleased. The Foreign Office was allowed to tell me only what the Chancellor wished, so that it happened sometimes that I was not informed concerning important occurrences. The fact that this was possible is to be laid at the door of the Constitution of the Empire. And this is the right place for saying a word concerning the relations between the Emperor and the Chancellor. In what follows I do not refer to my relationship to Herr von Bethmann, but, quite impersonally, to the difficulties in the relationship of the German Emperor to the Imperial Chancellors, which are caused by the Imperial Constitution. I wish to call attention to the following points: 1. According to the Constitution of the Empire, the Chancellor is the director and representative of the foreign policy of the Empire, for which he assumes full responsibility; he has this policy carried out by the Foreign Office, which is subordinated to him, after he has reported on it to the Emperor. 2. The Emperor has influence on foreign policy only in so far as the Chancellor grants it to him. 3. The Emperor can bring his influence to bear through discussions, information, suggestion, proposals, reports, and impressions received by him on his travels, which then take rank as a supplement to the political reports of the ambassadors or ministers to the countries which he has personally visited. 4. The Chancellor _may_ act pursuant to such action by the Emperor, and may make it the basis of his decisions, whenever he is in agreement with the Emperor's point of view. Otherwise he is supposed to maintain _his own_ point of view and carry it out (Kruger dispatch). 5. According to the Constitution, the Emperor has no means of compelling the Chancellor or the Foreign Office to accept his views. He cannot cause the Chancellor to adopt a policy for which the latter feels that he cannot assume responsibility. Should the Emperor stick to his view, the Chancellor can offer his resignation or demand that he be relieved of his post. 6. On the other hand, the Emperor has no constitutional means of hindering the Chancellor or the Foreign Office from carrying out a policy which he thinks doubtful or mistaken. All he can do, if the Chancellor insists, is to make a change in the Chancellorship.