The Land of the Miamis: An Account of the Struggle to Secure Possession of the North-West from the End of the Revolution until 1812Barce, Elmore
History
The Land of the Miamis: An Account of the Struggle to Secure Possession of the North-West from the End of the Revolution until 1812
Barce, Elmore
Indians of North America -- Wars -- 1750-1815; Miami Indians; Northwest, Old -- History
public life, were in open sympathy with the French and utterly detested
England. These sentiments were particularly marked in the western
countries, for there the people had suffered from all the cruelty and
savagery of the Indian warfare, and they fiercely denounced the British
agents.
Under all these circumstances the relations between Great Britain and
the United States had become tense and strained. The provincial officers
at Quebec and the Indian partisans at Detroit quickly echoed the mood of
the home government. In the event of a new war, England could again
command the savage allies and ravage the frontiers as she had done
during the revolution. The Indians would not only prove to be a useful
barrier in the event of an American invasion of Canada, but they might
help England to regain in part the territory she had lost. "Hence,
instead of promoting a pacification, the efforts of the Canadian
government were obviously exerted to prevent it." This, no doubt,
accounts for what Brant has noted concerning the exchanges with the
American commissioners at the mouth of the Detroit river. The western
tribes were suddenly given assurance by the British that England would
come to their aid, and were told to insist on the Ohio as the limit of
concession. This put an effectual stop to all further measures for
peace.
Wayne was now free to go forward with his campaign again, but so much
time had been consumed by the commissioners, and the militia were so
slow in arriving from Kentucky that the army did not take up its march
from Hobson's Choice until the seventh of October. The general now had
about twenty-six hundred effective men, including officers, thirty-six
guides and spies, and about three hundred and sixty mounted volunteers.
With these he determined to push forward to a position about six miles
in advance of Fort Jefferson, and about eighty miles north of
Cincinnati. He would thus excite a fear on the part of the savages for
the safety of their women and children, and at the same time protect the
frontiers. He expected resistance, for the Indians were "desperate and
determined," but he was prepared to meet it. The savages constantly hung
on his flanks, making attacks on his convoys of provisions, and picking
off the packhorses. On the morning of the seventeenth of October, a
force of ninety non-commissioned officers and men under Lowry and Boyd,
who were escorting twenty wagons loaded with grain, were suddenly
assaulted about seven miles north of Fort St. Clair. Fifteen officers
and men were killed, seventy horses killed or carried away, and the
wagons left standing in the road. Nothing daunted, Wayne pushed on. On
the twenty-third of October, he wrote to the Secretary of War that, "the
safety of the western frontiers, the reputation of the Legion, the
dignity and interests of the nation, all forbid a retrograde maneuver,
or giving up one inch of ground we now possess, until the enemy are
compelled to sue for peace."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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