The Last Ninety Days of the War in North-CarolinaSpencer, Cornelia Phillips
History
The Last Ninety Days of the War in North-Carolina
Spencer, Cornelia Phillips
North Carolina -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865; United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Campaigns
My Dear Sir: Yours of this date has just been received, and I entirely
concur in your estimate of the dangers that environ us.
I left Richmond thoroughly convinced that--
1st. Independence for the Southern Confederacy was perfectly hopeless.
2d. That through the administration of Mr. Davis we could expect no
peace, so long as he shall be supplied with the resources of war; and
that
3d. It was the duty of the State government immediately to move for
the purpose of effecting an adjustment of the quarrel with the United
States.
I accordingly remained at home but twenty-four hours (that being
the Sabbath, and having had no sleep the night preceding) before
repairing to Raleigh to lay before the Governor such information
as I possessed, and to urge him to convene the General Assembly
immediately. I told him that Richmond would fall in less than thirty
days, and would be followed probably by a rout or dispersion of Lee's
army for want of food, if for no other cause. That the Confederate
Government had no plan or policy beyond this event, although it was
generally anticipated. That I had reason to believe that General Lee
was anxious for an accommodation. That Johnston had not and could not
raise a sufficient force to encounter Sherman. That I had conferred
with the President, and found him, though in an anxious frame of mind,
constrained by the scruple that he could not "commit suicide" by
treating his Government out of existence, nor even ascertain for the
States what terms would be yielded, provided they consented to readopt
the Constitution of the United States. That the wisest and best men
with whom I had been associated, or had conversed, were anxious for a
settlement; but were so trammeled by former committals, and a false
pride, or other like causes, that they were unable to move themselves,
or in their States, but were anxious that others should; and that it
was now the case of a beleaguered garrison before a superior force,
considering the question whether it was best to capitulate on terms,
or hold out to be put to the sword on a false point of honor.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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