The testimony of M. Saint-Hilaire was undoubtedly one of the most extraordinary features of this extraordinary case. He began by making a speech after the fashion of M. Pelletan: “M. Roustan,” said the witness, “has had no personal influence in the recent events. The causes _of the war_ are more ancient. The security of our African colony was involved. Our frontiers were perpetually violated. The causes of this French enterprise are of old date. Of all the subordinates under my orders during my tenure of office, I have found few who possess as much zeal, intelligence, probity, devotion, energy, and docility as M. Roustan. Everything that has been said about his personal influence is false and calumnious. The treaty of Kasr-es-Said was signed on the 12th May, but the idea of it existed long before my accession to the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. I have collected the traditions, and put into execution the intention of my predecessors for a quarter of a century. . . . The treaty was sent from Paris, drawn up and ready for General Bréart to carry.” If this is true, what becomes of M. Saint-Hilaire’s repeated assurances to Lord Lyons in a very different strain? On the 6th April, for instance, Lord Lyons thus writes to Lord Granville:— M. Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire spoke to me this afternoon of the incursion of the Kroumírs from the Tunisian frontier into Algeria, and of the measures taken in consequence by the French Government. The French territory had, his Excellency said, for many years past suffered from the lawlessness of the tribes nominally under the sovereignty of the Bey of Tunis. More than 400 incursions of more or less gravity were on record, but this last had surpassed in atrocity those which had preceded it. French soldiers had been killed; the state of the frontier had become intolerable; and the French Government were determined to put a stop, once for all, to these attacks. They were, he went on to say, about to send a corps of from 12,000 to 15,000 men to the Tunisian frontier to inflict a signal chastisement on the Kroumírs and other lawless tribes. This number of men would be sent from France, and they would either go themselves to the frontier or take the place of troops already in garrison in Algeria, who, being inured to the climate, might perhaps be better adapted for active service in the expedition. The Bey of Tunis would be reminded of his responsibility as sovereign of the country whence the incursions proceeded, and would be invited to send troops of his own to co-operate with the French expedition. _The French troops would be assembled on the French side of the frontier, and they would not cross the frontier without necessity_; but they would be empowered to do so if their military operations required it. Should the necessity for entering the Tunisian territory arise, the French Commander would give the Bey notice.