The last Punic war, Vol. 2 (of 2) : $b Tunis, past and present : with a narrative of the French conquest of the regency.Broadley, Alexander Meyrick
History
The last Punic war, Vol. 2 (of 2) : $b Tunis, past and present : with a narrative of the French conquest of the regency.
Broadley, Alexander Meyrick
Tunisia -- History; Tunisia -- History -- French occupation, 1881-1956
It was the accident of my bringing the news of poor Le Faure’s sad end
to Susa, which introduced me to my fellow-traveller Dr. Pozzi. Our
conversation naturally enough first turned on Susa. “Here,” said Dr.
Pozzi, “everything began with a sanitary blunder. The troops, instead of
being distributed in different convenient places, were huddled together
in the Kasbah, just as if the Arabs were going to assault the town. As
we were at peace with the Bey of Tunis, no building could be taken for
an hospital except an old grain store under the city walls, surrounded
by the stagnant overflow of the neighbouring oil mills, and incapable of
being ventilated. At most it could only contain fifty beds. The soldiers
soon conceived a horror of this noisome den: they gave it the sobriquet
of the _dépôtoire_, and concealed their sickness to avoid going to it.
The crowding of 1200 men in the Kasbah soon _engendered_ typhoid fever;
the _dépôtoire_ perpetuated it. Beds, dressers, &c., were wanting, but
in a short time there were eighty sick soldiers in the grain store, and
the cooking and medicine compounding had to go on in the midst of them.
Later this was remedied, but the evil was already done.” Twelve deaths
had taken place in a fortnight. From Susa Dr. Pozzi went on to speak of
the question generally. In his opinion the excessive mortality amongst
the French soldiers in Tunis has several distinct and palpable causes,
viz., defect of transport, want of preparation owing to M. Saint-
Hilaire’s first fiction of a military promenade, inability to obtain
hospital accommodation on account of M. Saint-Hilaire’s second fiction
of a Tunisian alliance, obstinate refusal to accept any Red Cross aid,
and the almost total absence of villages and isolated houses for the use
of the ambulance in the interior. “The large number of deaths at the
Manouba hospital,” observed Dr. Pozzi, “are to be accounted for by its
being selected as one of the principal places for the receipt of the
sick from the interior, and by the means used to transport them thither.
Many died _en route_ from the effects of travelling under a burning sun
in an uncovered springless Maltese cart. It often happened that the
patients were tied together to prevent them falling out, and a doctor
told me that he had on one occasion _cut a living soldier from a
companion who had been dead several hours_.” Dr. Pozzi considers Bizerta
as an instance of the places in which typhoid fever was engendered by
defective provisions, crowding, overfatigue, and too great weight of
baggage. He thinks that the sanitary administration of the campaign
falls into three epochs—April to August, inexcusably bad; September to
November, improving; from November, good. Jerba, Gabes, and Fernána are,
according to him, the scenes of the most fatal mistakes. As regards the
first two localities, Dr. Pozzi’s information exactly confirms the
details given by MM. Lereboullet and Le Faure. “Fernána,” he says, “was
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account